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Supreme, Court of Iowa.
PORT1ER v. POWE LL.
The duty of a parent to furnish necessaries for his infant children, is
both a legal and a moral one; and a promise to pay for necessaries sup-.
plied to such children by a third person, will be implied from such legal
duty.
A child may be emancipated from the duty of service to the parent, yet
such emancipation will not relieve the parent from the duty to care for,
and control such child, nor from liability for necessaries, such as physician's services, .even though furnished without the knowledge of the
parent.
Bucm, J., dissenting.

Appeal from the District Court of Dallas County.
The District Court certifies to this Court the following
question, upon which itis desirable to have the opinion 'of
the Supreme Court:
Is a father legally liable to,a physician for the latter's services in professionally treating the minor daughter of said father, dangerously attacked
with typhoid fever, who, at the date of said treatment, was seventeen
years of age, and was then, and had been, residing away from her father's
house for three years prior to the rendition of said services, earning and
controlling her own wages, and providing herself with clothing, at a place
thirty miles distant from her father's place of residence, the father not
furnishing, or agreeing with his daughter to furnish, her with any money,
or means of support, but consenting to her absence from home; the said
professional services being rendered at the request of the said minor
daughter, but were rendered and furnished without the procurement,
knowledge, or consent of the defendant, and without knowledge of the
sickness, until demand was made for payment of said services by plaintiff,
the attendance of plaintiff being from day today, for a period of twenty
days?

W W. Cardelland R. S. Barr, for appellant
-Parsons& Perry and D. W. Wooden, for appellee.
GI"VN, J., January 29, E890. I. Appellants contention
is that the obligation of parents to support their minor children is only a moral one, and is not enforceable in the absence
of statute or promise; that such promise is not to be implied
from mere moral obligation, nor from the statute providing
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for the reimbursement of the public; and' that an,omission
of duty, from which a jury may find a prpnise by implication of law, must be a legal duty, capable of enforcement .by
process of law. At first glance, this view of the law seenm,
opposed to our natural sense of justice; yet it is not without
support in the authorities. Such is held to be -the law in
New Hampshire and Vermont See Kelley v. Davs (1870),
49 N. H. 187;-Parmingon y. Jones (1858), 36 Id.'27I;
Gordon v. Pofter (1845), 17 Vt 348. A different doctrine
hrs long since been held in this State. In Dawson v. Dawson (i86r), 12 Iowa 513, this Court held that "the duty of
the parent to maintain his offpring until they attain the age
of maturity is a j)erfect common-law duty." In Johnson v. Barnes (1886), 69 Iowa 641, which was an action by the
mother, who .had been divorced, against the father, for support firnighed their children, the Court say:
Asthere was no promise, the question to be deterlpiined is whether one
ew be inferred in favor of a wife, ivho supports her child, as against her
husband, who has without cause abandoned her and his child. The obligation of parents towsupport their children at common law is somewhat

uncertain, ill defined, and doubtful. Indeed, it has been said that there is
no such obligatio4. * * But we are not prepared to say that this rule
has been adopted in this country, and it should be conceded, we think,
that, independent of any statute, parents are bound to contribute to the
support of their minor children, and that such obligation rests mainly on
the father, in the absence of a statute, if of sufficient ability; and tha, in
favor of a third person, who supports a child, a promise to pay may and
should be inferred on the ground of the legal duty imposed.

In Van Valkhnburgh v. Watson (I816), -13 Johns. (N. Y.)
480, it is said:
A parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his
infant children; and, if the parent neglect that duty, any other person
'who supplies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit on
the delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise to pay
on the part of the parent.

In 5 Wait, Act. & DeL 50, the author says:
The duty of parents to support, protect, and educate their offspring is
•founded upon the nature of the connection between them. It is not only
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a moral obligation, but it is one which is recognized and enforced by law..
* In order to hold the person liable in any case for goods furnishpd,
either actual authority for the purchase must be shown, or circumstances
from which such authority may.be imiplied. * * The legal obligation
of parents in respect to support, extends only to those things which are
necessary, and if a parent refuses or neglects to provide such things foT
his rhild, and they are supplied by a stranger, the law will imply a
promise on the part of the parent to pay for them.

Without further citation of authorities, we announce as our
conclusions that it is the legal as well-as moral duty of
parents to furnish necessary support to their children during
minority; that a parent cannot be charged for necessaries
furnished by a stranger for his minor child, except upon an
express or implied promise to pay for the same; and that
such promise may be inferred on the grounds of the legal

duty imposed.
2: It is further contended on behalf of appellant that the

facts certified show an emancipation of his "daughter, such
as to relieve him from liability for the services sued for; that
support and services are reciprocal duties, and if one is withheld the other may be withdrawn. Parents are' entitled to
the care, custody, control, and services of their children
during minority. To emancipate is to release; to set free.
It need not be evidenced by any formal or required act. It
may be proven by direct proof or by circumstances. TQ
free a child, for all the period of minority, from care,
custody, control, and service would be a general emancipation; but to free him from only a part of the period of minority, or from only a part of the parent's rights, would be limited. The parent, having the several rights of care, custody,.
control, and service during minority, may surely release
from either without waiving his right to the other, or from a
part of the time without waiving as to the whole. A father
frees his son from service. That does not waive the right to
care, custody, and control, so far as the same can be exercised consistently with the right waived. He frees his son of
eighteen from service for one year. That does not waive the
right to his services after the year; and if the waiver has
been for an indefinite period, the parent may assert his right
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to the services of the child at any time within the period of
minority, subject to the rights of those who have contracted
with the child on the strength of the waiver as to services.
In the law of contracts, where a father expressly or impliedly, by his conduct, waives his right generally to the
services of a minor child, such child is said to be emancipated. The child may sue, under such circumstances, on
such contracts as are made with him for his services: ightingak v. Withington (188), 15 Mass. 272; McCoy v. iffman (1827), 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 84; Stiles v. Granville (185o),
6 Cash. (Mass.) 458; Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 267. There is
nothing in these authorities, nor any reason, against the
view expressed, that emancipation may be general or limited.
There is no direct evidence as to the purpose of the defendant with respect to his daughter; but we are to say, from the
circumstances shown, whether they evidence either a general
or limited emancipation. The case of Everett v. Sherfey
(1855), 3 Iowa 358, is relied upon. That was an action to
.recover damages of the defendant for having harbored, and
retained the plaintiTs minor son in his employ. The issues
and circumstances were quite different from those certified in
this case. The Court say:
There could be no such harboring as would render the defendant liable
to the father in this action, if the son was in truth emancipated, and, if
the son was not emancipated, it will still be a question whether there was
such harboring as renders the defendant liable. By "emancipation," in
this connection, we understand such act of his father as sets the son free
from his subjection, and gives him the capacity of managing his own
affairs as if he was of age.

The following is given as a condensed statement of the

facts:
In the spring or summer of 1 85 2 , plaintiff's son, a minor of the age of
seventeen, went to reside at defendant's house, and was then 'and afterwards employed by him as a hired.hand for over one year; the defendant
paying the son full wages for his services. In .February, 1853, plaintiff
sued defendant to recover for the services, in which suit the judgment
was for the defendant. The son was of a dissatisfied and roving disposition, careless and improvident in his habits, not under parental control,
and, either through willfulness or negligence, had not received the educa-
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tion proper for a person of his age and condition. In De~ember, i85x, a
misunderstanding arose bet*een the parent and the child, which resulted
in the son's leaving home, and residing and working at various places,
before he went into the defendant's service. After said December, z85I,
the father did not, apparently, have or exercise the proper and necessary

control and authority over the said minor that a parent of a well-regulated
family ought and should exercise, and permitted and sanctioned the hiring
out of said minor at various places, and at different employmients, away
from home ; but who made the contracts, or received the pay, is not stated
- nor proven. The father had also stated that he had no control over his
gon, and had in some instances waived his authority over him. It also
appears that on the eleventh of September, 1852, the plaintiff, by publication in a newspaper, forewarned all persons from rediting his said son on
his account, avowing also therein, that he would pay no debts of his contracting, and that he would not fulfill any contracts, or pay debts, entered

into by him:

The Court say:
From these circumstances, to mention none others, we think the Court
might fairly conclude therd was A manumissionl or emancipation up to the
time above stated, and that there was no liability for giving the son shelter, residence, and a home. At least, we think it so fairly deducible from
the facts that we should not disturb the conclusion.

The circumstances disclosed in this case are these: The
defendant's daughter, at the age of fourt&en,'went to reside
away from her father's house, at a place 'thirty miles distant,
where for three years she contracted for, earned, and controlled her own wages, and provided herself with clothing,
her fatherconsenting thereto; he not furnishing, oi agreeing

to furnish,' her with any money, or means of 'support. That,
'while thus absent, she was, dangerously attacked with typhoid'
fever, and at her request was attended by the plaintiff, as her

hysician, from day to day, for a period of twenty-one days,
which services were rendered without the procurement,
knowledge, or consent of the defendant. These circumstances are widely different from those in Everett v. Skerfey.

Here there was no disagreement that resulted in the daughter leaving home; no want or waiver of parental authority;
no dissatisfied and roving disposition; no statement by the
father that he had no control over his daughter, and no publication by the father notifying persons not to credit her on

his account. The circumstances disclosed in this case are
such as are of frequent occurrence in this country.

Parents,.
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either-from necessity or from a desire to teach their children
to be industrious and self-supporting, emancipate them from
se-vice, for a definite or indefinite time, without any intention
of thereby releasing their right to exercise care, custody, and
'control over the child. The obligation of parents to support.
their,minor children does not arise alone out of the duty of
the child to serve. If so, those who are unable to render
setvice because of infancy, sickness, or accident-who, most
of all others, need support-would not be entitled to it.
.Blackstone, in his Commentaries (volume i:p. 446), says:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is
a principle of natural law-an obligation, says Puffendorf, laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act in bringing them
into the world; for they would bein the highest manner injurious to their
issue if they bnly gave their children life that they might afterwbrds see
them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a
voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which
they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children: ll have the perfect right of receiving maintenance from their

parents.

This obligation to support is not grounded on the duty of
the child to serve, but rather upon the inability of the child.
'to care for itself It is not only a duty to the child, butto
the public. ,The duties extend only to the furnishing of
-necessaries. What are necessaries must be determined by
-the facts in each case. The law has fixed the age of major-ity; and it is until that age is attained that the law presumes
the child incapable of taking care of itself, and has conferred
-upon the parent the right to care, custody, control, and
services, with the duty to support.
3. There being no direct evidence as to the purposes of.
the defendant with respect to his daughter, we are to say
with what intention he consented to his daughter's going
and remaining away from his home as she did. That he intended she should control her own earnings, at least until
such time as h should declare otherwise, is evident; but
that it was ever his intention that if by sickness or accident,
she-should be rendered unable to support herself, he would
not be responsible to those who might minister to her actual
necessities, we do not believe. Such an inference from these
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facts would be a discredit to any father. In our viewv there
was, at most, but a partial emancipation-an emancipation
from service for an indefinite time. The father had a right
at any, time to require the daughter to return to his home
and service; and she had a right at any time to return to his
service, and to claim his care, custody, control, and supporL
There was no such an emancipation as exempted the father
from liability for actual necessaries furnished to his daughter.
In view of the legal as well as the moral duty of appellant
to furnish necessary suppqrt to his daughter during minority, and especially when unable, from infancy, disease, or
accident, to earn her own necessary support, we think he
may well be understood as promising payment to any third
person for actual necessaries furnished to her. As ah-6dy
.stated, what, are necessaries must be determined from, the
facts of each case What would be necessary support- to a
child in sickness would not be necessary in health.- The
services sued for were evidently necessary f6r the support
and well-being of the defendant's daughter. As we have
seen, he had not relieved. himself from the duty to furnish
her support, and, from his obligation to do so, may be presined to have promised payment to any one who did furnish it in his absence.
- Our conclusion is that the judgment of the District Court
should be affirmed.
BECK J., (dissenting.) i. I cannot assent to the doctrines
and conclusions announced in the majority opinion in this
case. The facts are presented in the certificate of the Judge
upon which the case is brought here on appeal. We cannot
look elsewhere for the facts. They are, briefly stated, these:
The daughter was seventeen years old, and, with the father's
consent, was at service thirty miles away from his home, and
had been for three years, all the time controlling her own
wages, and supplying her own wants, and receiving nothing
for support or necessaries from her father. The father had
no knowledge that services were rendered to the daughter by
plaintiff, or that his daughter was sick. It is not shown that
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the daughter was a pauper, or without means to pay the
plaintiff No presumption to that effect will be entertained.
2. These facts show that the daughter was emancipated by
the father. Emancipation may be shown by circumstances
from wVhich may be inferred the consent of the father that
the child may control his own time, earnings, and actions.
Slight circumstances tending to show such consent are suident, in the absence of contradictory evidence: Schouler,
Dom. Rel § 267;. Everett v. Sherfey (1855), I Iowa 356.
3- Emancipation relieves the child of subjection to the
parent, and bestows upon him the capacity of managing his
own affairs as if he were of age, (Everett v. Sherfey, suqra;
Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 268;) and it also relieves the arent
of all legal obligation to support the child, (Id. § 268.)
4. A parent is bound neither at common law, nor by any
statute ,of the State, to support his children who are of age:
Monroe Co. v. Teller (1879), 51 Iowa 670; Blackley v.
Laba (1884), 63 Id. 22. As I have shown, an emancipated
chll stands as to his obligation to his parent ,nd the points
exempt to orfrom obligation for his support, just as a child
who is of age.
5. It may be that the parent would be under obligation to
support a pauper child who is of full ag, or that a promise
would be inferred on the part of the father to render such
support. But that point is not in this case, as it is not
claimed that the child for whose support the father was sued

is a pauper, or not possessed of ample means to pay plaintiff
for the services rendered by him.
6. Doctrines as to the liability of the father for the support of his minor child, and his liability therefor upon a

promise, express or implied, and upon other points of the
law, are found in the majority opinion, to which I dissent.
As tending to support my views, I cite the following decisions of this Court: Dawson v. Dawson (i86I), 12 Iowa 512;
Johnson v. Barnes (1886), 69 Id. 641. See to the same effect, Schouler, Dom. Rel. § 236. In my opinion, the judgment of the District Court ought to be reversed.
Judgment affirmed.
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In- perusing the principal case,
two questions present themselves
to the legal mind. First, Is the
obligation of a father to support
and maintain his infant child, a
mere moral obligation, and therefore not enforceable in the absence
of an express promise, or is it a
duty imposed upon him by the
common law? And Second, Does
the emancipation of a child by the
parent absolve him from the duty?
Upon the first of these questions
there is very great conflict of opinion in the courts of this country,
except, perhaps, in cases where the
duty is imposed by statute. This
latter imposition, however, it is not
intended to treat upon in this annotation, which will, as far as possible, be confined within the limits
suggested by the questions pre-.
sented above, and for this reason:
that the statutes apply not only to
minor, but to adult children.
"The duties of parents to their
children, as being their naturalguardians," says KENT, "Consist
in maintaining and educating them
during the season of infancy and
youth, and in making reasonable
provision for their future usefulness and happiness in life, by a situation suited to their habits, and
a competent provision for the exigencies of that situation": 2
Comm. *I89. And "The duties
that are enjoined upon children to
their parents, are obedience" and
assistance during their own minority, and gratitude and reverence
during the rest of their lives" : Id.
*2o7. Moreover, the father, unless
guilty of some act which will empower the courts to decree otherwise, is entitled to the custody of
his child until it attains the age of
twenty-one years, which is fixed in
this country as the age of majority

and discretion, after which the
child becomes a free agent.
From the above, the question
would present itself, Are these
duties reciprocal, axe they dependent the one upon the other? Is it
maintenance and education in consideration of obedience and assistance? Cases are not wanting, in
which the duty of the father to
maintain his child during minority
is placed upon the ground that he
is entitled to the services of such
child, the one. being compensatory
of the other, the right to services
going hand in hand with the obligation to support: Morse v. Welton, (infra, page 33); Farrellv.
Farrell, (33); Husband v. Husband,(37) ; Everettv. Shbefey,(38) ;
Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg et
al, (36); Sazwyer v. Sauer, 39);
Gilley v. Gilley, (40); Addison v.
Bowie, (41); Greenwood v. Greenwood, (41); Nightingale v. Withington, (41) ; Clemens v. Brillhart,
(44) ; In the matter ofRyder, (48);
Farmanv. Van Sise, (49) ; Trustees
ofJefferson Townihip &c. v. The
Trustees of Letart Township, (49).
Although the question viewed in
the light of reciprocity is supported by the above opinions, the same
author (KNT) states the law to be
that "the parent is absolutely
bound to provide reasonably for his
maintenance and education, and he
may be sued for necessaries furnished, and schooling given to a
child, under just and reasonable
circumstances. The fatheris bound
to support his minor children, if
he be of ability, even though they
have property of their own," and
cites Stanton v. Willson, infra,
page 33, and Van Valkinburg v.
Watson, (48), in support of his
theory: 2 Comm. *19x. This statement of the law is taken objection
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to, and severely criticised, by Justice RnDs=rDn, in Gordon v. Potter
(1845), 17 Vt. 248, who considers it
unsupported by the authorities
In
(Infra, page 52.)
quoted.
S/anion v. Willson, the citation of
which in support of the Chancellor's statement is taken objection
to, the Court did say that "parents
are bound by law to maintain, protect, and educate their legitimate
children, during their minority or
nonage," while in Van Valkinburgh v. Watson the Court did not
express the theory m such clear
language. Be this difference of
opinion, however, as it may, there
are numerous authorities that uphold and endorse the learned Commentator's statement. This will
be found in Alstony. A/ston, infra,
page 31, Fuller v. Fuller, (34);
ullins, (34) ; Dawsonv.
Hines v.
Dawson, (38) ; Johnson v. Barnes,
(38); Tanner v.- Skinner, (39);
Addison v. Bowie, (41) ; Kinsey v.
The State ex rel. Shirk et al., (37);
Willis v. Jones,(41) ; Reynolds v.
Swee/ser, (42); Dennis v: C/ark,
(42) ; Gleasonv. CityofBoston, (42);
Brow v. Brightnan, (42); Courtwright v. Courtwright, (42); The
Matter of Besonby, (43), where the
law was applied to a stepfather;
MeShan v. MeShan, infra, page
44; Edwards v. Davis,(48) ; Walker v. Crowder, (49); Naguinay v.
Sandck (51); Norton v. Ailor,
(51); Evans v. Pearce, Grfitk
el al. v. Birdet als., (54) ; McGoon
v. Irvin, (54). And many of these
cases, along with others, support
this as the law, even when the
child has an estate of its own, provided the father is of ability.
So stronglyhas the question been
viewed in some of the Courts, as
being a legal obligation, that they
have considered it as analagous to

the obligation of a husband to support his wife. This responsibility'
of the husband is placed upon the
ground of agency. Such being the
case as between husband and wife,
the question may be asked, Why,
and upon what principle, should
the one case differ from the other?
Why should the law say a man
must support his wife, and not support his minor child? Surely the
one claim is as much a legal one
as the other. Yet it is said a man
must support his wife, but his own
offspring he is under no legal obligation to support. Why should
not a child be the agent of its
father for the purchase of such
articles as are absolutely necessary
for its well-being and subsistence?
A wife can only bind her' husband
for such, and surely the obligation
of the father to the child ought tobe the same. The theory is sup7
ported by the New York case of.
Cromwell . Benjamin (infra,page
49); by the New Hampshire case
of Hilsborougk v. Dering, (45),
and it would seem, by the language
of Justice MFTCArIv in the Massachusells case of Dennis v. Clark,
(42), and by that of Justice McKIXNNv in the Tennessee case of
Maguinay v. Sandck, (5i). It is,
however, taken objection to by Justice R]DFMrLD, in the Vermont
case of Gordon v. Potter, (52), who
says, "there are substantial reasons why it should be" different,
and a distinction is taken byjustice WITSON in .the Illinois case of
Huntv. Thompson (35),whorecognizes the claim of the wife as one
of common law, while that of the
child is only one of natural law,
"left to the natural and unextinguishable affection which Providence hag implanted in the breast
of every parent."
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Cases are not wanting, however,
which show that where there is an
omission of parental duty, the
father is liable for necessaries furnished to the child residing under
the parent's roof, and also where
the child is forced to leave the same
by the father's conduct.
Two cases may, however, here
be noticed as illustrating to a high
degree the great conflict of opinion

upon this question.

Itwillbeob-

served that they are both cases
where medical aid had been rendered to the child, who in each instance was residing with the father.
In the Missouri case, the child was
living with the father when taken
sick, while in that of Vermont,.
the child was emancipated, and
being taken sick returned home,
in both, it would seem, the childcalled in his own physician. In
the former case, -Rogersv. Turner
(1875), 59 Mo. 116, although the,
Court admitted that medical services might be necessaries, it held
the father was not under any obligation to pay for services .rendered
without his knowledge or assent;
while in the latter, Sivain v. Tyler
(I853), 26 Vt. 9, the'Court held the
father liable. It also appeared that
in the latter case the father had
published a notice of an express
agreement made between himself
and his son upon the latter's emancipation, to the effect that he
would' not be responsible for the
debts of his son.
If the rights and duties of the
parties are, as have been pointed
out, reciprocal and dependent the
one upon the other, it would seem
that the release of such duties on
the one side ought to work a relaxation of those on the other. Yet it
has been held that even though a
child may be emancipated, the

father's duty to watch over and discipline the child still remains, and
further that such emancipation
may really be for the purpose of
discipline, to teach the child to be
industrious and thrifty, in order
that it may the better prepare itself
for success in .the world. To this
effect is the language of Justice
Cr,AaK in Beaver v. Barr (1883),
1o3 Pa. 58, "the exercise of'parental authority is not necessary
for the profit of the parent, but for
the advantage of the child, the duty
of service by the child being deemed necessary to the proper exercise
of parental authority, for its own
good. Although we still recognize
the right of the father to the personal services of his children thQ
right is simply incidental to the
duty of the father to discipline and
direct them, his right to personal
custody and personal service are
secure to him, therefore, in order
that through -them, prompted by
natural affection, he may successfully impart to them hatits of industry, methods of thrift and the
means of personal succkss in life.
* * The right to their services
being merely for their good, whenever the father finds their interest
or his own better subserved by their
emancipation, he can liberate-them.
This emancipation may be as perfect when they live together, under
the same roof, as if they were separated; for although the father
thus relinquishes his right to their
services, as a means of discipline,
the duty of discipline still remains,
and this duty can be better exercised in the family than elsewhere."
It has been truly said that "a
child is not like a horse or any
other chattel," which may be made
the subject of absolute gift; a
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father cannot relieve himself of his ity to bind the parent. If a child
responsibilty by giving away his leave his father's house to seek his
child, except by decree of a court
fortune in the world, or avoid
of competent authority, neither
domestic discipline and restraint,
can he be deprived of his right to
or escape from justice, the authorits custody: Chapskyv. Wood et al. ity of the father to purchase neces(i881), 26 Kan. 650.
saries, is not implied. But if a
The cases may be said to be father abandon .his duty to his
unanimous in holding that in order infant child, so that he is forced to
to render a father liable to a stran- leave his house, he is liable for a
ger for necessaries furnished to his suitable maintenance.
And the
infant child, there must be either principle of distinction is, that in
an express promise or the circum- the one case, the father is blamestances must be such as imply such
less, and in the other, blameable."
pSromise in law, but they are not
In the more recent case of Alston
unanimous in holding that such
v. Alston (1859), 34 Ala. i, wherepromise will be implied from the 'in the plaintiff sought a settlement
obligation to support, neither are and account of his father's guarthey unanimous upon the question
dianship, the Court says, "It is a
of the father's liability after an
general rule of law, that the father
emancipation of the child, or after is bound to support his minor chila degree a vinculo, or a mutual dren, if able to do so, even though
agreement between the father and they have property of their own;"
mother to live separate and apart.
following the rule laid down by
In Alabama, the early case of Chancellor KI NT,and by the preOwen v. While (1837), 6 Porter
vious cases of Pharisv. Leachman
(Ala.) 435, where articles had been
(1852), 20 Ala. 685, and Bethea v.
furnished by the plaintiff to the McCall (1843), 5 Id. 3o8, and subminor son of the defendant, rules sequently approved in Beasley &
that "A father is not bound by the
Wife v. Watson (1867), 41 Id. 234.
contract of his son, even for articles
In Stovall v.Johnson (1849), i7
suitable and necessary, unless an
Ala. 14, it was held that "a father
actual authority be proved, or the is bound to support his minor chilcircumstances be suffiient to imply
dren, and is entitled to their serone. So long as the child convices, * * * [but] is under no
tinues under the direction and conpositive obligation to advance or
trol of the father, it is left to the
even educate his children."
discretion of the parent to deter- I In Arkansas,the father, it would
mine what is necessary for him,
seem, is liable for their support, for
unless it appear that there is a
in Holt v. Holt (1883), 42 Ark. 495,
clear omission of parental duty in
the Court held that "The dissolu*providing for his maintenance.
tion of the marriage tie, and decreeWhere this is the case, the law ing the custody of the children,
subjects the father to the payment
either permanently or temporarily
for necessaries furnished by a third to the mother, do not relieve the
person, upon the ground that his father of his obligation to support
neglect to do that which natural,
them. If they are too young to
moral and municipal law have preearn their own livelihood, the
scribed as a duty, implies an author- father must continue to furnish
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them a maintenance out of his estate, regard being had to his means
and condition in life." In this case
there had been a decree a vinculo,
by which the custody of the children, until six years of age, was
given to the mother, without provision for their maintenance, for
which she sued the father.
In the more recent case ofJordan
v. Wright (1885), 45 Ark. 237,
where suit was brought to recover
money expended by the plaintiffin rearing and maintaining defendant's infant daughter, Chiefjustice
Coc i=rz declares that "The duty
of parents to provide for their children is, says Blackstone, a principle of natural law. While there is
conflict in the authorities in determining when this moral obligation
becomes a legal one, all are agreed
that the moral obligation of the
parent to perfom this duty, is a
sufficient c6nsideration to sustain a
promise to pay another to relieve
him of the burden. Circumstances
from which a promise may be in i
ferred will raise the presumption of
an implied contract in this as in
other classes of cases. Indeed, so
zealous are the courts to enforce
this obligation, that slight evidence
has soifietimes been held sufficient
to warrant the inference that the
parent has contracted to pay for
the maintenance of, or necessaries
furnished, his infant child."
In California,the Civil Code provides, "Suc. 196. The parent entitled to the custody of a child must
give him support and education
suitable 'to his circumstances, If
the support and education which
the father of a legitimate child is
able to give are inadequate, the
mother must assist him to the extent of her ability. SEC. 203. The
abuse of parental authority is the

subject of judicial co'gnizauce in a.
civil action brought by the child, or
by its relative within the third degree, or by the supervisors of the
county where the abuse is established, the child may be freed from
the dominion of the parent, and
the duty of support and education.
enforced. SEc. 2o6. It is the duty
of the father, the mother, and the
children of any poor person who is.
unable to maintain himself by
work, to maintain such person to,
the extent of their ability. The
promise of an adult child to pay
for necessaries previously furnished
is binding. SEc. 207. If a parent
neglects to provide articles necessary for his child who is under his.
charge, according to his circumstances a third person may in good.
faith supply such necessaries, and.
recover the reasonablevaluethereof
from the parent. SEC. 208. A parent is not bound to compensate the
other parent, or a relative, for the
voluntarysupport ofhis child, without an agreement for compensation, nor to compensate a stranger
for the support of a child who has
abandoned the parent without just
cause."
The duty of a parent,. or one
standing in loco pbarentis, to support and maintain his minor children is further illustrated by the
case of Starkey v. Perry (x886), 71
Cal. 495, where the plaintiff, the
uncle of the defendantas administrator of her mother's estate, had
received certain moneys as her portion of the estate, and claimed to
have expended on behalf of the defendant for necessary clothing,
board and lodging, a sum in excess
of such receipt, which sum the defendant refused to pay. While acting in that capacity, the plaintiff.
took the deftndant to live in his
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own home, as a member of his family, she being then a minor. Here
the Court held that "when the defendant became a member of the
family of her uncle, at his request, the uncle stood' towards her
ix loco parentis, 4nd in that relation hewas bound in law to sup-

port and maintain her according to
circumstances. Her support and
maintenance included necessaries
of.food, clothes, and lodging, far
which he could not charge her, asa
member of liia family, any more
than he could charge for such
things, one of his own children."
In the very early case of Stanton
v. Wilson (I808), 3 Day (Conn.)
37, where there had been a decree
of divorce a vinculo, the mother
having the custody of the children,'
and becoming their guardian, the
Court said, "Parents are bound by'
laW.to maintain, protect, and: educate their legitimate children, during their infancy, or nonage. This
duty rests on the father; and it is
reasonable it should be so, as the
personal estate of the wife, and in
her possession at the time of the
marriage, becomes the property of
the husband, ad instantly vests in
him. By the divorce, the relation
of husband and wife was destroyed;
but not the relation between Bird
[the father] and his children. His
duty and liability, as to them, remained the same, except in so far
forth as he was incapacitated, or
discharged, by the terms of the
decree. * * It may be generally
-true,that minors under the government of parents cannot bind their
parents for necessaries without
their consent., The danger of encouraging children in idleness and
disobedience, and of their being inveigled into expense by the artful
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and designing, furnishes a sufficient'reason for the rule; but
neither the rule, nor the reasoning,
will apply to the charges in respect
to two of the children in this case.
The articles wvere furnished by the'
guardian herself, or at her request;
who, in virtue of her trust, had Ufl

power to contract, andmike the
father liable for necessaries, not.
only without, but against his consent."
The more recent case of Morsev.
Webs" (1827), 6 Conn. 547, although actually deciding another
question, supports the rule, that
the father is bound to maintain,
protect ind educate his child, upon
the ground that he is entitled to
the services of his minor child.
In Farrellv. Farrell (1868), ,3
Houst. (Del.) 633, the precise question was not before the Court, the
action being on assumpsil by the
sdn against the father for money
had anti received to and, for the
son's use while he was a minor,
such money having been earned by
the son by his own industry while
living apart from his father, and
was sent by him to his father to
hold 4zid invest for him as he directed. In delivering the opinion,
Chief Justice GiLpni remarked,
"Whilst. it is the duty of a father
to nourish, support and maintain
his minor child, it is equally the
duty of such child to obey and
serve his father, in all that may be
reasonably required of him. These
duties are -reciprocally binding
upon the parties; support and
maintenance on the one hand and
obedience and service on the other,
the one being dependent upon, and
compensatory of the other. And
although the general principle is
clear and unquestioned, that the
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father is entitled to the services of
his minor child, and to all that
such child earns by his labor, yet,
it seems to be equally clear, that,
as the right of the father to the
services of his child is founded
upon his dutyto suppqrt and maintn
his child, if he should fail,
-neglect, or refuse to observe and
perform this duty,.his right to the
services of his child should cease
to exist And such we hold to be
the law. I speak here of the civil
rights and duties or obligations
which belon4 to the r2lation of
parent and child. Human laws
deal with these alone. There are
undoubtedly, other and higher

brought against the appellant by
his child, through her next friend,
for an accounting for the property

of her mother (the late wife of the
appellant) and the income and
profits thereo
The bill alleged
that the appellant was amply able
to provide from his own resources
for the education and maintenance
of appellee in a suitable manner;
thi was denied, and the appellant
claimed an amount therefor to be
allowed out of the estate. The
Coure said, "It is the duty of a
father, if he can, to maintain and

educate his child during the latters

nature growing out of this relatibu,

minority, even though the child
have an estate," but in .this case
the father's estate being alone sufficient for his own support, he was

- hich are eyond the cognizance

"aUoed to charge his daughtet

of any hunian &ffiunaL"
'In the D.LWri of Columbia, the
cae of Holrman v. Casteman el

-income with her own support.
In Georg-ia,, Hina v. Mulbtu

duties of a moral and rsligious

als. (1876),2a McArth. (D. C.) 55,
was a suitin equity brouglii by the
pLantiff against her father, the deJendant, as -administrator and nat- ural guaidian, for an account of
the, rents and profits, and a decree
of her share, the defendant claiming to have expended the money
in her support, and that of the
other. children. The Court said,
" A father is in duty bound to support and maintain his children.
This is a duty relative to circumstances. He is also entitled to
their services. He is only'bound
to keep them from want for the
actual necessaries of life."
The
facts showing that the father had
expended the estate in giving the
children a good education beyond
that which his own means per* mitted, he was allowed such expenditure in the account.
In Florida, Fuller v. Fuller
(1887), 23 Fla. 236, was a suit

(1858), 2,5 Ga. 696, was an action
brought against the father on his
bondas guardian, to pay over the
estatein his hINds to the plaintiff
the father claiming a deduction for

his children's maintenance.

The

Court laid down the rule that "A
father is bound to support and educate his children if he is able to do
so,, and that, whether they have
property of their own or not."
The father being at the time well
able to support his children was
not allowed to make the deduction
claimed. The same learned Judge
who delivered the opinion of the
Court in the above case, BmnqING,
J., subsequently in Brown & ArcCoy v. Deloack (1859), 28 Ga. 486,
where suit was brought against the
father for articles supplied to his
infant son, adds, " Even if a father
is bound to farnish his child with
necessaries, and fails to do so, that
does not impose an obligation on
any third person to discharge this
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duty of the father. If a third person does it, then he does it voluntarily, and what right have voluntary services to expect more than
Here,
voluntary compensation."
however, it was shown that the
goods were not necessaries, and
the plaintiff failed to show that
the father had not supplied his
child with a proper supply of such
articles as those furnished., The
Court citing numerous English
cases, and approving of the. doctrine therein established, to the
effect that a father is not bound to
pay for necessaries furnished to his
minor son without his authority,
held the father not liable.
In lliaois, in Huniv. Thomtpso
(184T), 3 Scar. (Ill.) 179, a.minor
son went, with the approbation of
his father, upon ii visit to some
friends, and at the time was suitably provided with apparel, but his
stay being a long one, he became
in need of new clothes, which the
plaintiff made for him, and brought
action for the price. It appeared,
however, that the son did not live
with his friends, but boarded at a
tavern, and contracted this and
otherdebts, which his friends considering extravagant, informed his
father of, who immediately gave
notice by letters that he would pay
none of his son's debts, but it did
not appear that the plaintiff knew
thereof. Here Chief justice Wir.soN, in holding the father not liable for 'the goods, says "That a
parent is under an obligation to
provide for the maintenance of his
infant children, is a principle of
natural law; and it is upon this
matural obligation alone, that the
duty of a parent to provide his infant children with the necessaries
of life rests; for there is no rule of
municipal law enforcing this duty.

The claim of the wife upon the
husband, for necessaries suitable to
his rank and fortune, is recognized'
by the principles of the common
law, and by statute. A like claim,
to some extent, maybe enforcedi
favor bf- indigent and Infirm rents, and other relatives against
children, &c., in manyces; but,
as a general rule, the obligation of
a parent to provide for 1is off.
spring, is left to the-natural and
inextinguishable affection ,rhf h
Providence has implanted if th
breast of every parent. This natural obligation, however, is not onlya sufficient consideration for an
express promise by a father to pay
for necessaries furnished his child,
but, when taken in connection
with various circumstances, has
been held-to be sufficient to raise
an implied promise to that effecL
But either an express promise 4:r
circumstances from whi~h a promise by the father can be inferred,
are indispensably necessary to bind
the parent for necessaries furnished
his infant child by a third person.
* * ,It is the act of the parent,
and not those of the infant, thAt
are to be looked to as affoding a
presumption of authority that wl
render him liable."
The case of Mc2illen v. Lee
443, was an action(1875), 78 M11.
brought to recover for medical services rendered to a child of the defendant, who along with the
rqother, -was living separate and
apart from the defendant, the
father. It was not disputed that
the services were necessary, but
the question was, whether, under
the circumstances, the father was
liable, the services not having been
rendered upon his employment,
and he had not made any express
promise to pay for them. The facts
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of the case are important, the evidence showing that the mother
was living with a third person as
housekeeper, under an agreement
to pay her weekly wages and keep
the child as part of his family, and
thatthis party called in the plaintiffE
There would appear to have been
two separations between the husband and wife, the first being
made on account of the child, the
wife saying it was hot the defendant's child, and that she would take
it and keep it; subsequently they
lived together again, but again
parted, the separati6n being by
mutual consent. Upon these facts
justice SH=DoN considered "the
principle as laid down in x Parsons
oA Contracts, 307, would apply
here: that, where the father and

judgment of the Court below,
which was for the plaintiff.
In Indiana;in Hollingsworthv.
Swedenborg el ux. (1875), 49 Ind.
378, the action was brought to recover for work done for the defeudant by the plaintiff's minor
daughter, and the judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff. In reversing the judgment, no express
contract being shown, and the
daughter living away from home,
Justice Dowmw states that "Independent of statutory enactment,
there is no legal- obligation on a
parent to maintain his child. The
common law considered the perfornance of the moral obligation

,and duty as better secured by the
-

impulses of our nature, than by
legal enactmentL The duty is one

mother separate, and the father

of imperfect obligation, that is, a

permits the mother .to take the
child with her, then the father constitutes the mother his agent to
ptovide for his child, and is bound
by her contract for necessaries for
them." With respect to the genend rule of law applicable to this
question, the defendant objected to
the instruction given in the Court
below, to the effect that the law
does not require an express promise by a father to pay for medical
services rendered to his child, but
that if necessary, or rendered
under circumstances which raise
an implied promise, the law will
imply a promise; on appeal, the

duty for the enforcement of which
the law provides no renedy.. * *
Hence we think the statement of
the rule, wit reference to the right
of the father to the services of his
minor child, making it dependent
upon the condition that the child
is maintained by the father, must
be correct. For if the father does
not maintain the child and is
under no obligation enforceable by
law to do so, the child must, of
necessity, be entitled to its own
earnings, or have no means of subsistence." He relies upon Farrell
v. Farrell, sufra, page 33, and

learned Judge remarked,

"We

recognize the lawto be * * that
either an express promise, or circumstances from which a promise
by the father can be inferred, are
necessary, in all cases, to bind the
parent for necessaries furnished his
infant child by a third person."
The Court held that there was an
implied promise, and affirmed the

quotes the language of Chief Justice GirPN.
In Wallace v. Ellis (1873), 42
Ind. 582, the wife left her husband
without cause, takingthe two children with her, and went to reside
with the plaintiff, her brother-inlaw, who sued for the board of the
wife and children. It appeared,
however, that the father was able,
ready and willing to support his
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minor children at his own home,
and therefore the plaintiff, who
had supplied them with board
without the father's coisent, could
not recover, the facts not showing
that the husband in living separate
from his wife, had allowed the
children to reside with her, consequently there was no implied contract constituting her his agent for
necessaries for the children on his
credit.
The more recent case of White
el al.v. M'ann (I886), IIo Ind. 74,
where the action was against the
father to recover for goods supplied
to his daughter, establishes and
supports the principle that a father
is not bound by the contracts or
debts of his son or daughter, even
for necessaries, as a rule, unless
circumstances show an authority
actually given or to be legally inferred. Consequently the action
failed.
In Husband v. Husband (1879),
67 Ind. 583, the question before the
Court was, "Does the law imply
an obligation on the part of the
father to pay his former wife for
her support and maintenance of
the minor child or children of the
marriage, where she has obtained a
divorce from him, and has, in the
decree, been awarded the custody
of such child or children?" And
in answer the Court said, "This
question must, we think, be answered in the negative. The right
of the parent to the services of the
child, and the obligation of maintenance devolving upon the parent,
have been said to be reciprocal
rights and obligations." Continuing, WORDUN, J., says, "And, if
the principle above announced be
correct, neither the former wife nor
anyone else could maintain an
action against the father, for the

support and maintenance of the
child, while he'vs deprived of her
custody and services, on anyobligation arising out of duty."
In Kinsey et al. v. he State ex
rel.Shirk et al. (1884), 98 Id-,35,
the question was, whether the
guardian and father of an infaxkt
child could assert and maintain a
legal claim against the estate of
his ward for taking care of, and
supporting her during the first fiveyears of her life, or for expenses
incurred by him on that account?
And waa answered by the Court in
the negative in these words:
"When the father and guardian, as,
in this case, has the means and
ability to care for and support his
child during the tender years of
infancy, it is his duty to do so, and
he will not, for the care and support thus given, be allowed to
claim against his ward's estate."
Inlowza, in Hunt v. Hunt (x854),
4 G. Green (Ia.) 216, there had
been a decree in divorce whereby
the husband had the right to the
custody of the minor child, then
held by its mother, from whom he,
in this action, claimed its care and
custody. In granting him the relief sought the Court said, "The
father has legal power over the
child until it arrives at the age of
twenty-one years. There can be
no doubt of the paramount right
of the father to the possession, care.
and control of his minor child.
But the right of the father to have
its society, filial affection and services, as well as to see to its health,
education, &c., are not the only
matters for consideration here.
When he is not under some disability, legal or otherwise, the law
holds him responsible to the child,
and in accordance with the -principles of nature and sound moral-
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ity, makes him answerable for the case of Johnson v. Btrns (1886),
69 Iowa 641, where the Court said,
preservation of its health and support. He is also under legal obli- "In favor of a third person who
gation to the community in which supports a child, a promise to pay
may, and should, be inferred, on.
he resides, to maintain and support
the ground of the legal duty imthe child."
In -Everett Sherfey (185), I
posed."
In this case the action.
Iowa 356, much relied on in the was by the wife against the husprincipal case, the facts of which
band, after a decree in divorce, for
sufficiently appear therein, supra, the support of the child, but the
Court held she could not recover,
page 2q3, the Court (WRIGH, C. J.)
said, "As it is the duty of the as the case was governed by Secfabher, to educate, protect and tion 2214 of the Cede of that State.
nurture his children, so it is his
The point was raised in Kansas,
right to have their society,, their in Harrisv. Harris(x869), 5 Kan.
services, and the control of their 46, when there had been a decree a
moral and intellectual training. vinculo between the husband and
These rights and duties are correl- wife, which gave the wife the cusative.. * * At common law, the tody, &c., of the children. After
father bad a right to sue for, and the decree, another child was born,
recover the money due for, the and the wife brought suit against
minor's services. He was entitled .the father to recover money exto it, the same as that due for his pended by her in supporting all
-own services. * * By emancipa- the children. Here Chief Justice
tion * * we understand, such
KXGmAN, in refusing her demand,
act of the father, as sets the son remaiks, "Our statutes, so far as.
free from his subjection, and gives
we are aware, leave this obligation
him the capacity of managing his of the father, as at common law, a.
own affairs, as if he was of age.
natural obligation to support, pro* * In the absence of statute, tect and educate the child he has.
the rule that now obtaini is, that
brought, into existence, with a
such emancipation need not be power in the appropriate tribunal
evidenced by any formal, or record to. enforce the obligation as beact of manumission, but is a ques- tween the father and the community.
But this obligation rests
tion of fact, which may be proved
by direct proof, or from circum- equally with the mother, and this
.whether it be regarded as a legal or
stances."
In Dawson v. Dawson (1861), 12 natural duty; originally it was a
purely natural obligation, resting
Iowa 512, an action to recover
compensation for the support of upon both parents alike. * * *
the defendant's father, who was With this obligation on the part of
also the uncle of the plaintiff, the parents arise accompanying
''the Court, in holding the defend- rights, and among these is that of
the parent to the society, comfort,
ant not liable at common law, said,
"The duty of the parent to main- obedience and services of the child.
tain his offspring until they attain
Can a stranger take these from a.
the age of maturity is a perfect parent, and then compel him, by
common law duty." This view of suit at law, to reimburse him for
the law is taken in the more recent
what he may deem fitting care and.

T"
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education of his child? This would
not be just, neither is it law. * *
We are aware that in many cases
* * courts have declared that a
father is bound to support his
minor children, if he be "ofability
to do so, but in most which we
have had an opportunity to examine, the question raised in this
case was not before the court, and
the general declaration of such a
principle, without limitation or
qualification, suffioic'ntly shows
that the attention of the court had
not been given to the question.
No one supposes that a father,
poor and infirm, is bound to support a healthy, robust son, of eighteen, though he be a minor, except
as he has a right to his services,
and of control over his actions ; or
that any father is dependent upon
the changing fashions and varying
tastes of the hour in determining
what is best for his child; nor
does anyone suppose it more the
duty of the father than of the
mother to support the children;
both are alike entitled to love, society, obedience and services of
their offspring; they are alike interested in their welfare, and in
deciding what is best calculated to
promote it with reference to their
ability and means, and also to their
other duties to themselves and to
others. It is true, that while the
coverture exists, the legal responsibility, so far as strangers are concerned, may rest exclusively on
the father, but as between themselves and the children, the duty is
as much that of the mother as the
father."
In the more recent case
of Sawyer v. Sauer (i873), xo Kan.
5i9, Justice BREWER, in disallowing the action by the father to recover for loss of the services of his
minor son, recognized the theory

that "The father is under obligations to support his minor children,
and entitled to receive the benqfits
of their services. * * The right
to services goes hand in hand with
the obligation to support. The
father's right to services extends to
the period of majority. He may
alienate or relinquish it for a while
and afterwards assume it." And
still more recently in Chapsfky v.
Wood et al. (88M), 26 Kan. 65o,
where suit was -brought by the
father for the custody of his minor
child, the same learned Judge in
decreeing against the father, remarks, "The father is the natural
guardian, and is prima facie entitled to the custody of his minor
child. The right springs from two
sources: one is, that he who brings
a child, a helpless being, into life,
ought to take care of that child
until it is able to take care of
itself; and because of this obligation to take care and support this
helpless being arises a reciprocal
right to the custody and care of
the offspring whom he must support; and the other reason is, that
it is a law of nature that the affection which springs from such arelation as that is stronger and more
potent than any which cprings
from any other human relation.
* * A child is not in any sense
like a horse or any other chattel,
subject matter for absolute and
irrevocable gift or contract. The
father cannot, by merely giving
away his child, release himself
from the obligation to support it,
nor be deprived of the right to its
custody."
In Kentucky, it would seem to
be held the legal duty of a father
to support his infant children, for
in Tanner v. Skinner (1874), 11.
Bush. (Ky.) 120, the Court said,
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"'It is the natural and legal duty of
a father to support his childreni
and it is only under peculiar circumstances that he will be allowed
to charge them for maintenance
and education." This was an action
upon a guardian bond, in -which
the sureties answered that the
father was a poor man, worth less
than any of ,his children, and
should be paid for rearing them.
The Court below adjudged the sureties not liable for the amount
claimed, but this judgment was reversed on appeal.
The question now under consideratiot would seem in Louisiana,
to be governed by the Civil Code of
that State, for it is provided by
"ART. 227: Fathers and mothers
by the very act of marriage, contact together the obligation of
supporting, maintaining, and eduIn St.
;cating their chtildren."
Louis University v. Prudhomme
.
Wife (1869), 21 La. Ann. 525,
the suit was brought against the
wife, the husband being a nominal
plaintiff, after a decree in divorce,
to, recover for board, tuition, and
expenses of the minor son of the
marriage. In decreeing the wife
not liable, the debt having been
contracted before the divorce, the
Court remarked, "The very act of
marriage also superinduces between the parties the comrunity
of acquets and gains, unless it
should be otherwise stipulated by a
,matrimonial contract. This obligation upon both the spouses to
defray the expenses of maintaining, supporting and educathig their
common offspring necessarily subsists during the continuance of
the community, although the husband, beifig the head and master
of that community, is preeminently
To the
liable for all its debts."

same effect Michie et at. v. Arneat
et al. (186o), 15 La. Ann. 225.
In Maine,. Gilly v. Gilley (1887),
"79Me. 292, was an action brought
by the mother against the father
for the support of the younger
children after a decree a vinculo
on the ground of the -father's desertion and failure to support.
Here Justice ViRGN, in affirming
the judgment of the Court below,
which held the father liable, states
the law as follows: "It is matter
of common knowledge that a
father is entitled by law to the services and earnings of his minor
children.- it is equally well known
that this right is founded upon the
obligation which -the law imposes
upon him to nurture, support
and educate them during infancy
and early youth, and it continues
until their maturity, when the law
determines they'are capable of
providing for themselves. * * A
minor, who voluntarily abandons
his father's house, without any
fault of the latter, carries with him
no credit on his father's account
even for necessaries. Otherwise a
child impatient of parental control
while in his minority, would be
eLcouraged to resist the reasonable
control of his father and afford the
latter little means to secure his
own legal rights beyond the exercise of physical restraint.

*

*

*

We are aware that courts of the
highest respectability, especially
those of New Hampshire aid Vermont, hold that a parent is under
no legal obligation, independent of
statutory provision, to maintain
his minor child, and that in the
absence of any contract on the part
of the father, he' cannot be held
except under the pauper laws of
those States which are substantially
like our own.

But *

*

the law
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was settled otherwise in this State
before the separation and has been
frequently recognized in both
'States since, and we deem it the
more consistent and humane doctrine. When the divorce was decreed in behalf of the wife the defendant ceased to be her husband,
but he still remained the father of
the children * * witl all the
father's duties and legal obligations
full upon him."
In Weeks v. Merrow (855), 40
Me.

i5I,

the action was against the

father, to recover for the board of
his minor son, who had left his
father without his parent's consent
or knowledge, and worked elsewhere. Justice Racn in ordering
a nonsuit, lays down the law thus:
"Where a child leaves his parent's
house, voluntarily, for the purpose
of seeking his fortune in the
world, or to avoid the discipline
and restraint so necessary for the
due regulation of families, he carries with him no credit, and the
parent is under no obligationf.to
pay fobi his stqpport. This doctrine
is well sustained by authority, and
though, at times, it may operate
with apparent severity, is based
upon sound principles. To permit
a minor, at his election, to depart
from his parent's house, with
power to charge that parent with
his support, would tend to the destruction of all parental authority,
and invert the order of family government. If a minor is forced out
into the world by the cruelty or
improper conduct of the parent,
and is in want of necessaries, such
necessaries may be supplied, and
the value thereof collected of the
parent, on an implied contract."
In Maryland, the early case of
Addison v. Bowie (1840), 2 Bland
Ch. (Md.) 6o6, wherein the father

was held liable to account, as the
natural guardian of his children,
for the profits of certain negroes
held by him in trust for his children, and could *make no deduction therefrom for their support,
decided that "A father is bound to
maintain his infant children, if
able, and, therefore, nothing is
ever allowed to him for that purpose out of the infant's peculiar estate, unless upon special
grounds." And also that such support must be reasonable according
to his means and circumstances.
In the more recent case of Greenwood v. Greenwood (1867), 28 Md.
369, where the father successfully
brought action for the seduction of
his minor daughter, it is said,
"The father is entitled to the cus-,
tody of their 'persons and to the
value of his children's labor during their minority, because during
that period he is bound to maintain
them." And further, "The common law has wisely limited the
period during which the child is to
be under the father's control, and
is entitled to look to him for support, and it cannot be changed
without some positive a& of the
Legislature to this especial end."
And although the exact question
did not arise in Willis v.Jonesel al.
(1881), 57 Md- 363, the opinion
supports this theory.
In Ma=achusells, Chief Justice
PARXBR holding the maker of a
promissory note, made to an infant
in payment of his services, liable
to a subsequent holder, even after
payment to the father of the infant,
it not being shown that the father
had prohibited payment to the son,
in Nighlingale v. Withing'lx
(i88), i5 Mass. 272, thus states the
law: "Generally the father, in
case of his death the mother, is en-

PORTZR V. POWELL.
titled to the earnings of their minor
children.
This right mu9t be
founded upon the obligation of the
parents to nurture and support
'their children; wbich obligation is
compensated by a right to their
services, or to the fruits of them,
'If by their permission they are employed by other persons.
But
'where the father has discharged
: himself Of the obligation to sup%*rtthe child, or has obliged the
child to support himself, there is
no principle, but that of slavery,
which will continue his right to
receive the earnings of the child's
labor. Thus if the father should
iefuse to support a son, sh6uld
deny him a home, and force him
tolabor.abroad for his own living;

Oshould give him his time * *
the lawwiU imply an emancipation
of the son; and although it will
got allow him to contract to his
pi judice, it will give him the benefit of such contracts as are made
with him for his services."
In Reynolds v. Sweetser (i86o),
1s Gray (Mass.) 78, the husband
-was sued for the board of his -wife
and six-year-old child. , It appeared that the wife was compelled
to leave her husband by cruel
treatment, and took the child along
with her. Justice MRRICK, holding the husband liable, says: "A
-father can never, under our law,
(Rev. Stat. c. 46, 5; c. 78, 1) as
long as he has pecuniary ability,
be absolved from the obligation of
relieving the necessitie ad contributing to the maintenance of his
child." In Dennis v. Clark (1848),
2 Cush. (Mass.) 352, where a father
was held entitled to recover an indemnity for money expended
through injuries sustained by his
infant child, Justice MCALF fdedared that "By the common law

of Massachusetts, and without reference to any statute, a father, if
of sufcient ability, is as much
bound to support and provide fqr
his infant children, in sickness and
in health, as a husband is bound by
the same law and by the common
law of England, to support and
provide for his wife. *
* Ifa
husband desert his wife, or wrongfully expel her from his house and
make no provision for her support,
a person who furnishes her with
necessary supplies may compel the
husband, by an action at law, to
pay for such supplies. And our
law is the same, we have no'doubt,
in the case of a father who deserts
or wrongfully discards his infant
children." And in the more recent
case of Gleason v. City of Boston
(1887), 144
ass. 25, where action
was successfully brought by the
treasurr of th& Commonwealth
against the City, for money expended in the relief of a minor,
Justice DEVtNS said: "By the
common law, as it exists in Massa-

chusetts, the father is bound to,
support his minor children, and
this even if he deserts them. * *
The legal obligation which the
father is under to support the
minor child is usually assigned as
the reason why he is entitled to recover its wages when it has profitable employment." To the same
effect, Brow v. Brightman (1883),
136 Mass. 187. ,
From the Michigan case of
Courtwrightv.Courtwright (1879),
4o Mich. 633, it would seem that
the duty is considered in that State
to.be "a legal obligation," and that
"as against the public and the
children," the father cannot "throw
off the duty." In that case there
was an agreement between the
father and mother whereby the

I

THE RIGHT TO PARENTAL SUPPORT.

father was held liable to pay the Court say, "An express promise,
mother for money expended in the or circumstances from which a
promise may be inferred, must be
maintenance and support of some
of the infant children. In Tyler
proven before a father can be
v. Arnold (1882), 47 Mich. 564,
charged for goods sold and delivthe son, a minor, spent most-of his ered to his minor child, by a third
time away, and ivas allowed to re-, party."
In Johnson v. Onsied (1889), 74
tain and spend most of the money
he earned; the action was brought
Mich. 437, there had been a divorce
a vinculo giving the wife the care,
to recover for a suit of clothes.
The defendant had never opened management and maintenance of
any account with the plaintiff, and the child of the marriage; the wife
had, in his own dealings with him, married again and along with her,
always paid in cash; he had never second husband, the plaintiff, took
authorized his son to purchase on
the child and cared for it as their
his credit, nor had he ever given
own. Subsequently the plaintiff
the plaintiff to so understand. The brought suit against the defendant,
Circuit Judge charged the jury that the father of the child, to recover
for its care, support and maintethe parent was under a general
nance. The Court found that the
moral and legal duty to provide
necessaries for his infant child, and defendant was not liable, as "there a
that in case of his failing in this was no contract, either express or duty willfully or negligently, a
implied, * * made by the defendant, under which he could be
stranger might supply the necessaries at his expense. Chief Jus- held liable," and further, that the
wife could make none to bind him
tice GRAvns, however, on appeal
said that "the facts did not author- without his consent.
ize the consequence which the
In Minnesota, in The M'ater of
charge permitted the jury to draw Besonby (1884), 32 Minn. 385, the
from it." The C6urt therefore did
rule as laid down by KxT,supra,
not discuss the qxestion of parental
page 28, the Court said would apply to a stepfather who voluntarily
responsibility.
assumes the parental relation, and
Golts v. Clark (1875), 34 Mich.
229, was a case of goods sold and receives the stepchildren into his
delivered to the defendant's wife family under circumstances such
and minor daughter, and so far as as to raise a presumption that he
those sold for the wife's use, judg- undertook to support them gratuiment was given for plaintiff, but
tously. There does not seem to be
any case expressly determining the
with regard to those sold to the
question as between parent and
daughter, the Court held he was
not liable. In this case the goods child in this State, but from the
bought by the daughter were of
above, it is presumed that the law
as defined by the Chancellor govlittle value, and such as she needed,
erns therein.
and without which she had. not
In Mississiipi, the father is reenough to make herself comfortable. She was, however, living
sponsible for the maintenance of
his minor children, having a right
away from his house, working for
to fix their domicile and control
wages, and receiving the benefit of
her own labor. In the opinion the
the household, with the duty im-
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-posed upon him to provide for and
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Court say, "While thelaw, in the
absence of stipulations to the contrary, authorizes the parent to appropriate the earnings of his minor
child, yet the right arises out of the
obligation to support and educate
.the child." The Court below having given preference to an attachment issued by the intervenor, its
judgment was modified so as to
give the plaintiff a first lien on the
mortgaged premises.
One of the earliest cases in New
Hampshire is Pidgin v. Cram
(1836), 8 N. H. 350, where there
had been a mutual separation beappeal.
tween the husband and wife, and
In Rogers v. Turner (1875), 59
subsequently a child born; the
Mo. 116, the action was brought to
plaintiff sued the husband for the
recover for medical services to the
support of the wife and the child.
There was an agreement between.
son. It appeared that the son was
aminor living with his father, and the husband and his wife's father
consulted and employed plaintiff that the latter should support his
daughter: the Court held the'dewithout the knowledge or consent
of the father, who had a family
fendant not liable as far as the
physician. Neither the son nor
goods supplied to ihe wife were
the plaintiff advised the father of concerned, and with regard to
the fact until eighteen months those furnished to the child, Chief
after the services were rendered.
Justice RIcHaRDSON, delivering the
The plaintiff's action failed, NAP- opinion of the Court, said: "There
ToN,J.,saying: "Medical services are cases in which a faiher may be
of [thisi character inight be con- liable for necessaries furnished to a
sidered as necessaries, but the child. As where he places his
father never having refused to sup- child in a situation to require
ply the son with any medical atten- necessaries, without providing the
tion that might be necessary, was means of obtaining them. And in
under no obligation to pay for ser- general, a parent is under d natural
vices rendered without his knowl- obligation to furnish necessaries
ledge or consent."
for his infant children; and if the
In Nebraska, although Clemens parent neglect that duty, any person who supplies such necessaries
v. Brilhart (1885), 17 Neb. 335,
was not decided upon the question
is deemed to have conferred a benenow under consideration, it being
fit on the delinquent parent, for
an action brought to foreclose a
which the law raises an implied
mortgage executed by a father to
promise to pay on the part of the
parent. But in order to authorize
huis son, to secure moneys owed by
the father to the son, a third party any person to act for the parent in
intervening and alleging that the such a case there must be a clear
and palpable omission of duty in
mortgage was fiudulent, yet the
,educate his children: McShan v.
.Mfc.Shan (1879), 56 Miss. 413.
In Missouri, the case of Girls'
IndustrialHome v. Fritchey(i88i),
io Mo. App. 344, followed the
view taken by KENT, supra, page
28, although it admitted there was
very great conflict in the opinions.
In this case the defendant was sued
as the guardian rif the widowed
mother of an infant child, having
moneys in hand to pay for its support and maintenance. The Court
below gave judgment against the
defendant, and was affrmed on
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that respect on the part of the
parent." It did not appear, so far
as the child was concerned, that
application to the father for assistance, had been made or refused.
The child, a daughter fifteen years
of age, might have been capable of
furnishing herself with e~erynecessary, by her own exertions, and
therefore the Court exonerated the
defendant from liability. In Hilsborough v. Deering (1827), 4 N.
H. 86, suit was brought for the support of the defendant's pauper
daughter and her infant child; the
Court below being of opinion that
the defendant was not shown to be
of sufficient ability, gave judgment
in his favor. This was, however,
reversed on appeal, the Court saying: "It is very clear that the
claim of unenancipated children
to support from their parents stands
on very different ground from the
claim of any other description of
persons to support from their kindred. By the common law, and
independent of the statute, such
children are entitled, and have a
perfect right to support from their
parents. * * As on the one hand
be rthe father] is entitled to their
services until they arrive at the age
of twenty-one years, so on the
other hand he is by the common
law bound to support them so long
as he has any means whatever.
They *

* stand upon the same

ground as his wife." Litchfield v.
Londonderry (1859), 39 N. H. 247,
to the same effect.
In Kelley v. Davis (187o), 49 N.

H. 187, the action was brought to
recover the price of necessaries sold
to the defendant's minor son, who
was seventeen years of age and at
work at the time. The fath.r had
given the son his time, but it was
not shown that plaintiff knew

thereof. The Court below found.
the claim, subject to some reductions, a legal one. In a very
lengthy and elaborate opinion, Justice FosTim, after examining the
previous cases in that State, and.
those of Vermont, New York, and
Massachusetts, reversed this judgment, saying: "On the whole, the
principles of law applicable to this.
class of cases seem to take the
form of these propositions: that a
parent cannot be charged for necessaries furnished by a stranger for
his minor child, except upon &
promise to pay for them; and that
snch promise is not to be implied.
from mere moral obligation, nor
from the statutes providing for the
reimbursement of towns; but the
omission of duty from which ajury
may find a promise by implication
of law must be a legal duty, capable
of enfbrcement biprocess of law.*'
To the same effect, Hammondv
Corell (1871), 50 N. H. 505; Toum
of Farmingtonv. Jones (18S8), 36
Id. 271.

In New Jersey, Freeman v. Robinson & Smalley (1876), 38 N. J.
Law. 383, was a judgment in the
Court below for goods supplied to.
the defendant's son; thisjudgment
was reversed on appeal, Justice
l)EPuE stating the law thus: "The
duty of a father to provide maintenance for his children is a mere
moral obligation. E xcept in cases
within the statute of Elizabeth,
and by the procedure there pointed.
out, he is not legally compellable to.
perform this duty. No action ca.
be maintained against a father for
goods purchased on his credit by
his minor child, even though they
be necessaries, unless the father
has expressly or impliedly authorized the purchase on his credit.
The authority of an infant to bind.
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the father by contract for necessaries may be inferred from slight
evidence. But, nevertheless, where
the parent gives no authority, and
enters into no contract, he is no
more 'liable to pay a debt contracted by his child even for necessaries,
than a mere stranger would be.
The mere moral obligation of a
parent to maintain his child affords
no legal inference of a promise to
pay a debt contracted by him even
for necessaries."
The learned
.udge goes on to show that in
order to bind a father even for
necessaries; it must appear that
they are "proper to be provided
for-the maifitenance having regard
to the estate and social position of
hIs father, or were indispensable to
his life or bodily comfort. * * *
The moral obligation of a parent
to provide for his 'children must
have some limit. It is not so far
reaching in its operation as to impose a duty on the parent to proVide everything which the taste or
!xtravagance of the 'child may
prompt him to desire, or tradesmen may see fit to provide. The
obligation is limited to the furnishing of such articles as are necessary to the maintenance and sup'port, leaving to the parent, in virtue of his parental authority, a
discretion how far he may deem it
prudent to exercise his generosity
in the indulgence of his child."
In this case the charge to the
jury in the Court below was intended to present the question
Vvhether a moral duty, independent
of any legal obligation, is a sufficient consideration to give validity
to a subsequent express promise by
the father. After an examination
of Hawkes v. Saunders (1775), X
Cowp. 29o, and Wennall v. Adney
(1802), 3 B. &P. 247,Justice DZPuu

remarks, upon the languagd of
Lord MANSp=nLD in the latter case:
"The justice of this observation is
apparent from the cases cited by
the Chief Justice as illustrations of
the application of the doctrine.
He enumerates promises to pay
debts, the recovery of which is
barred by the Statute of Limitations ; a promise by a man after he
becomes of age to pay a just debt
contracted during minority, but
not for necessaries; a promise by a
bankrupt after his certificate, to
pay his debts in full ; and a promise to perform a secret trust, or k
trust void for want of writing by
the Statute of Frauds. In each of
these instances, there was, originally, a consideration of benefit to
the promisor, from which a promise wouldhave been impliedcaphle
of legal enforcement, if some statutory provision or positive rule of
law had not debarred the party
from legal remedy." . He then
quotes the note to Wennail v.
Adney, supra, and adds: "The
principle thus enunciated was approved by Lord DrmANm in Eastwoody. Kenyon (i84o), ii A. & E.
438, dnd adopted. by the judges of
the Queen's Bench in .eaumont v..
Reeve (1846), 8 Q. B. 486, and may
now be considered as the settled
law in the English courts. It has
also been approved and made the
basis of judicial decisitn quite
generally by the courts in this
country."
And concludes by defining the law to be " that a mere
moral obligation, or duty as an
executed consideration, is not a
sufficient consideration to support
a subsequent express promise. If
services be rendered, at the request
of the promisor, which are for the
benefit of a third party, towards
whom the promisor owes only
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moral duties, they may be recovered for. In such cases, the precedent request'and services rendered
in compliance therewith, afford a
consideration from which a promise to pay would be implied, or
such as is needed to uphold an express promise. Butwhere the duty
is one of moral obligation only,
and the service is rendered without
a previous request, a subsequent
promise to pay is without the consideration which is necessary to the
validity of a contract."
In a New Jersey case, Tomkins

v. Tomkins (z858), 3 Stock. (N. J.)
the plaintiff sued for an account of the property of his deceased mother. The defendant had
presented an accountfor the support
of -the plaintiff's children by, the
testatrix, obtained a judgment in
attachment for the same, and sold
the plaintiff's share' thereunder.
The plaintiff had abandoned his
wife and child to the charity of the
world, and the wife found shelter
in the almshouse. The child was
forced upon its grandmother, the
testatrix, a woman then- advanced
in years, and of moderate iheans.
There was no evidence that during
the fifteen years the child was
'under its grandmother's care, the
father ever made any inquiry as to
its whereabouts or welfare. The
Chancellor in view of these facts,
remarked, "The law, as it has been
adopted in this State, is as laid
down by the Court in Van Valkinburgh v. Watson [inra]. A parent
is bound to provide his infant children with necessaries ; and if he
neglect to do so, a third person
may supply them, and charge the
parent with the amount. But such
third person must take notice of
what is necessary for the infant,
.52,

according to his situation in life;

and where the infant lives with his
parent, and is provided for by him,
a person furnishing necessaries cannot charge the parent. 'When the
infant is sub polestate piarentis,
there must be a clear and palpable
omission of duty, in that respect,
on the part of the parent, in order
to authorize any other person to
act for and charge the- expenses t6
the parent.' * * If there was
"an doubt as to the legal obligation
of the father to provide for his
child, and of his legal liability to
such as should supply that child
with the necessaries of life, the
moral obligation is so strong that a
court of equity would feel but little
inclined to grant relief, on any
such ground as that the moral obligation had been converted into a
legal one." The billwas dismissed,
but solely upon the ground that
the defendant had obtained a legal
advantage..
In McKnight's Executors, v.

Walsh (x872),

23

N. J. Eq. 136,

suit was brought for the settlement
of the account of the testator's
estate, the whole of the infant's
share having been paid to its
father, and applied by him in the
support of himself and his children. The Court, in holding that
all beyond what had been properly
paid for the maintenance and education of the infant was paid by
the trustee in his own wrong, said,
"In general a father is bound to
support his infant children, and is
not entitled to have the income of
their estate appropriated for their
support without an order of some
proper court based upon his inability to support them." Tothesame
effect, Stevens Adm'r v. Sen
Ex'r (1873), 23 N. J. E-q. 296r
Tompkins v. Tomptkins (x867), 18
Id. 33.
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In New York, the early case of
Van Valkinburgh v. Wilson et al..
(186), 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 430, was
an action against the father to recover for a coat supplied to his son.
The law was declared thus: "A
parent is under a natural obligation
to furnish necessaries for his infant
children; and. if the parent neglects that duty, any other person
who supplies such necessaries is
deemed to have conferred a benefit
on the delinquent parent, for which
the law raises an implied promise
to pay on the part of the parebt.
But what is actually necessary will
depend on the p3recise situation of
the infant, and which the party
giving the credit, must be acquaintedwith, athisperil. * * Where.
the infant is sub potesateparentis,
there must be a clear and palpable
omission of duty, in that respect,
on thepat of the parent, in order
to authorize any other person to
act or, and charge the expense to,
the parent." There being no-evidence 'to charge the father with
any neglect of duty, the Court held
him not liable.
.In Ike matter of Ryder (x844),
iPaige (N. Y.) x85, the Chancellor refusing the petition of an infant twenty years of age for maintenance, support and education out
of his mother's separate estate, his
father being dead, and she having

.married again, says: "A parent
who has the means, is undoubtedly
bound to support his or her minor
child, that is, to afford a bare support. The law, however, gives to
the parent a corresponding right to
the services of the child while such
stipport is afforded; for the parent
is not bound to support his children in idleness, even if his property is sufficient to enable him to
do so. * * A stranger may fur-

nish necessaries for the child, an&
recover of the parentcompensation
therefor, where there Is a clear and
palpable' omission of duty, on the
part of the parent, in supplying
a minor child with necessaries,"
and cites Van Valkinburgh v.
Watson, sufira, in support of his
contention. He further states that
' the neglect of a parent to provide
for his infant child of tender years,
and who is incapable of providing
for himself, is an indictable misdemeanor," and relies upon, Rex v.
Friend(x8o2), Russ. & Ry. C. C.
2o. The Chancellor, however, ;made
an exception in this case on the
ground of the son's age, and his
being able to support himself by
his own industry: '
In the case of Raymond v. Loyl

(18s), zo Barb. (N. Y.) 483, the
action was to recover for clothing*
supplied to the defendant's infant
child; the Court below found for
the plaintiff, but on appeal H.&m,
J., said: "Aparent is under anatural obligation and duty to furnish
necessaries for his infant children.
How that obligation is to be enforced, is not so clear." He cited
the language of Spiwmc,
C. J., in
Edwardsv. Davis (819); 16 Johns.
(N. Y.) 285, (where the action was
to recover for necessaries furnished
to the defendant's parents, and
judgment was given for defendant)
to the- effect that "it is a perfect
common law duty." After an-examination of these principles and
of the cases which support them,
the learned Judge added, "though•
stated so broadly, and by such eminentjurists, an examination of the
cases, throws doubt upon this position." The' Court therefore held
the defendant was not liable, there
being no legal obligation independent of statute, unless there be
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an express or implied contract,
to be in conflict with Zn the Matter
which could not be, where the inof Marx (1878), 5 Abb. N, C. (N.
fant leaves the parent's home con- Y.) 224, where the Court, in suit
trary, to such parent's wishes, as
for an account of the moneyswhich
came to the defendant's hands as
was the case in that suit.
his wife's administrator, which he
Chief Justice J. SmITH in Cromwell v. Benjamin (x863), 4x Barb. claimed to have expended upon
(N. V.) 558, in affirming the judg- the children, held a father was not
ment of the Court. below, which
bound to support his infant chilwas fr the plaintiff, the action
dren, where they have property'
being to recover for goods supplied that may be applied for that purto the defendant's wife and child,
pose.
looked upon the liability of a
In the more recent case of Parker
parent to supply necessaries for his v. Tillinghast (x887), i Abb. N.
minor children as analagous to
C. (N. Y.) i9o, the defendant's inthat of a husband to support a
fant son, away at school, contracted
wife; he -ays: "The liability of a debt for clothes and an overcoat,
the defendant to furnish necesit being winter, fur which suit was
saries for his son who was a minor, brought against the defendant, the
and for his daughter, who although
father, who was held liable, the
a few years past her majority, was
Court saying: "The defendant'a
unmarried and a member of his liability * * springs from the
family, and who, as appeared * * *relation of the parent to his offwas an invalid unable to support
spring, and is founded on a moral
herself by her labor, springs from
duty to furnish necessaries for his
the relation of a parent to his off- infant children zccording to his
spring, and depends upon principles
means."
analagous to those above considIn North-Carolina;in Walker v.
ered in respect to his liability to -Crowder(1843), 2 f.eq.
(N. C.)
support his wife."
478, where the question was raised
"The right of parents," says as to the right of the-sureties under
Justice AL1iM in his dissenting
the father's guardian bond, to come
opinion in Furman v. Van Sise in under a deed of assignment exe(x874), 56 N. Y. 445, where the cuted by the father for the benefit
action was brought by the mother,
of his creditors, the Court refused
the father being dead, for the se- to allow deductions by the father
duction of her daughter, and the on account of the education of the
judgment of the Court below in
children because "It was, by the
favor of the plaintiff was affrmed,
settled rule of our Courts the duty,
"to the services of their children
of *, * [the] father, to maintain
results from their duties; and the his children, if of ability; and, if
duty of the father to support his
not, he should have the sanction of
infant child is absolute, irrespective
the proper court to an application
of the means of the child or his of the children's property to that
ability to care for himself; and purpose."
from this results the absolute right
In Ohio, Trustees of Jeffersox
to the services of the child during
Township, &cc. v. The Trutees of
his minority." This would appear
Letart Township (1827), 3 Ohio 99,
Vor. rn- 3
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and lodging of the defendant's
son. The.judgment of the Court
below, which was for the plaintiff,
was reversed, and the law thus
stated: "In general a fatheris not
liable on a contract made by his
minor child, even for necessaries
furnished, unless at actual authority.is proved, or the circumstances
be sufficient to supply one." Here,
however, the plaintiff had disregarded the defendant's notification
that he would not be liable,
In Gerkr v.' Bauerline (c888),
17 Or. zx5, a suit against a guardian,
who was also the step-fatherof the
'plaintiff, for an account, the -Court
.said:."If a step-father voluntarily
assumes the care and support ofia
step-child, he stands in locoparexlis, and the presumption then is,
that they deal with each other as
parent and child, and not as master
and servant, and in such case the
ordinary rules applicable to parent
and child will apply." In this
case he did not act so as to stand
in loco parentis, and was allowed
to charge the estate with maine* * This natural duty is not to be nance and support.
In Fillerv. Filler (1859), 33 Pa.
.evaded by the huAband's so con.ducting himself, as to render, it 5o, suit was brought against the
necessary to dissolve the bonds of defendant to recover money exmatrimony, and give to the mother pended by the plaintiff in the supthe custody and care of the infant port and maintenance of the de.offspring. It is not the policy of fendant's minor son. It appeared
the law to deprive children of their that the husband had obtained a
rights on account of the dissen- - decree in divorce against the' wife,
sions of their parents, to.which who had deserted her husband bethey are not parties; or to enable fore the birth of the child; and had
te father to convert his own mis- since retained the custody thereof,
conduct into a shield against pa- supporting and mintaining it,
though the father had offefed to
rental duty."
The question of the liability of take the boy and support him.
the father upon his infant chil- The Court below found for the dedren's contracts was brought be- fendant, and Chief Justice LowrMe
fore the Supreme Court of Oregon, in affirming the judgment, said,
in Carney v. Barrett (1871), 4 Or. "When a man abandons his child
and casts it upon the public, he be171, a suit to recover for board

was a suit between two townships
to recover moneys expended in the
snppot of a minor whose father
was dead. There the law is thus
stated:. "The parent is bound both
by the laws of nature and the laws
of the land, to provide for and take
care of his infant child, andin return is.entitled to the services and
control of the child. This right is
so perfect that, unless in extraordinary cases, it cannot be'interfered
.with." The son had left his father
without cause, and the Court found
for the defendant township.
In Prelzinger v. Pretzinger
(1887), 45 Ohio St. 452, wherein
the defendant was, after proceedings and Aecree in divorce, held.
liable for the support 6* his, minor
children, upon the wife's action,
Justice Dxc.MAH says: "Theduty
of the fWther to provide reasonably
fir the ziaittunaace of his minor
.cildren, if fie be of ability, is a
principle of natural law. And he
is under ,obligation to. support
.them, not -only by the laws of
,nature, but bythe laws of the land.
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comes liable for its support. . But his relative duties towards them,
it is entirely impossible to treat a according to lhls ciicumsaiices -andchild as thus cast on the public, condition in life. As husband, he
when the fact simply is, that the is absolutely bound to"provide rcamother has deserted the father, and sonably for the support-of his wife;
carried away the child and con-. and as father, he is in like mander
tinues to support it. This is merely bound to provide for the mainteleaving it with her, until she nance and education of his chilchooses to restore it; and while dren, during their minority, if of
she keeps it on such ground, she sufficient ability. As head of the
has no claim for compensation."
family, he alone is iesponsible in
law, for the proper control and
In Gill v. Read (x858), 5 R. I.
343, where the husband and wife government of his hbusehold*; he
lived separate and apart from each alone is punishable for its misgovother, the wife having the custody ernment or disorder, even though
of the child, the husband was held the wife or family may be tie
liable for necessaries furnished for cause of disorder. The husband is
such child, the Court saying: "If not by law, bound to maintain a
* * he suffer his child to live child of the wife by a former husseparate from him with her, lie band. But if he receives stiAh
thereby constitutes her his agent to child into his own house, he is
contract for the child's necessaries; then considered as standing in oco
and is liable to those who furnish fiarentis, and is responsible for the
maintenance and education of the
them upon his credit."
In Tennessee, the position of a child so long during its minority,
father toward his minor children is as it lives with him, for by so
thus stated by Justice McKnq y doing, he holds the child out t6 the
in Maguinay v. Sandck (1857), 5 world as part of his family. This
Sneed (Tenn.) x46, where the plain- is precisely the obligation 'of a
tiff was allowed to recover for the father, as respects the support of
seduction of his minor step-daugh- his minor child." The case of
ter: "By the common law the Norton v. Ailor (i883), xI Lia
husband is the sole and absolute (Tenn.) 563, where a step-father's
head of the family; and of this suit against the administrator of
character and relation, with its at- his infant step-daughter's estate,
tendant rights and obligations, he for compensation for support, was
cannot be divested-in the absence dismissed by the Court, supports
of mental or moral incapacityand approves the law as thus
during the continuance of the stated.
In Teras, Fowlkes v. Baker
matrimonial union, as respects the
wife, or the minority of his chil- (867), 29 Texas 135, was an action
dren as respects them. The sepa- where the plaintiff recovered from
rate legal existence and authority the father the price of godds supof the wife is suspended, and plied to his infant son. Justice
neither she, nor the minor chil- W=nLr, in delivering the Opinion
dren, can do any act, except by his of the Court, says: "Much conflict
authority expressed or implied, to of authority exists as to the ground
bind him or prejudice his rights, upon which rests the legal liability
so long as he reasonably discharges of a father for necessaries furnished
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his hifant child. Some insist that
it grows out of the natural duty of
the parent to provide sustenance
agtd support for hisoffspring; others
say, that it is a question of agency
aind authority, and that a parent is
only bound for such articles as are
furnished with his consent express
or implied. * * The result of all
the authorities seeins to be properly
laid down by Parsons in his treatise
on Contracts, vol. i, p. 253, ' That
where, the goods are not necessaries, the father's authority must
be proved to render him liable;
where they are necessaries, the
father's authority is presumed,
unless he supplies them himself,
or was ready to supply them.

Wherb the intant lives with the
f tl r, 6r under hfi control, his
judgtnent, as to 'wlat'are neces-

daries, 'l

be so far resp*'ected, that

the hire of slaves bequeathed byhermother, to herand her brother;
the defendant, the administrator of
her deceased father's estate, claimeA
to set off the expenses of her nutrture and education. The Couri
held that "the father and naturA,
guardian, wad bound by the obligations both of law and morality to
raise and educate his children 'it
his own expense," and further,
that "the law'gave no ight to him
to deduct from or cut down (a]
legacy which they received fromn
their mother, for this purpose,"
and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
The Vermont cases iupport the
theory that the obligation is a
moral one. thus in Gordon v.
Potter (1845), 17 Vt. 348, the son,
a minor, was at work by permission of the father, the defendant,
who told him to go to work, aild
promised to get him some clths
in the fal The father'knew of A

ie will be held liable only for
things furnished to the infant to
purchase of clothes made by his
'elieve him from absolute want.
iThere the infant 'does not live son, and had furnished him ia
one dollar to pay for making themi
iiith the father, but hts voluntarily
up, permitted him to wear them
feft him, the authority of the father
out, and gave him part of his earnmust be strictly proved, unless,
ings. The -Court below rendered
perhaps in cases of absolute necessity, and 'where he has been de- judgment for the defendant, to"
which the plaintiff exceited. The
serted by the father, or' driven
opinion of the Court, affirming that"
away from him, either by comof the Court below, was delivered
mand or cruel treatment, then the
infant carries with him, the credit .by Justice Rawrw: "It doqs
not appear, except by way qf inand authority of the father for
necessaries.' *
The authority ference, that the articles charged
were furnished upon the credit of
to make * * * the purchases
must be proved in the one case,
the father, or, in other words, that
and in the other it is inferred,
the plaintiff, at the time they were
unless rebutted by circumstances
delivered to the son, expected the
showiig that the parent had supfather to pay for them. And I take
plIed the infant himself, or 'was it to be well settled law, that, if
ready to supply him."
In the one trades with the son, and gives
more recent case of Buckley's credit to him alone, knowing all
Adm'r v. Howard & Wife (1871),
the facts in the case, he can never,
35Teas,565, suit was brought to
after that, sustain an action against
recA moneys due the'plaintiff for the father for articles thus 'deliv-
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ered. And this upon the ground,
that, if one trade with the agent,
and give credit to him personally,
knowing of his agency, the principal is not liable. * * It does
not appear that the father ever
gave the son any authority, either
,expressly, or by implication, to
pledge his credit for the articles;
but the contrary. And unless the
father can be made liable for necessaries, for his infant child, against
his own will, then, in this case, the
plaintiff must fail to recover. I
know there are some cases, and
.dicla of Judges, or of elementary
writers, which seem to justify the
-conclusion, that the parent may be
made liabl for necessaries for his
-child, even against his will. But
-an examination of the cases upon
this subject will not justify any
;such conclusion." Proceeding, he
'takes objection to the law as defined
by Chancellor KrNT, sufira, page
28, and remarks that the case of
Van Palkinburghv. Watson (1816),
13 Johns. (N. Y.) 480, "was in
favor of the father. The Court [in

'that case] say, indeed, that, had he
absolutely refused to furnish neces:saries to his minor child, he might
be made liable for them, when furnished by a stranger. But the decision involved no such question,
.and called for no such declaration."
With regard to the case of Stanton
v.
7lilson (1808), 3 Day (Conn.) 37,
-heremarks that the rule laid down
therein "is broad enough to make
the father liable against his will,"
but he points out that in that particular case "the necessaries had
,been furniihed to the child by consent of its legally constituted guar-dian, the mother, after a divorce a
-winculo." And concludes his criti-cism by saying: "But, notwith-standing the usual accuracy of the
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learned commentators referxed to,
[KM.T and Swum], it needs no
further argument to show, 'that
their opinion, on this pqint, is
without the support of any decided
case." He then reviews the IEPgiish
authorities very fully, and concludes by saying: "A father, who
supports his family, ought, it would'
seem, to be consulted as to the
mode in which it shall be done;and, if he will not support them,
' being of ability,' the statute points
out the, remedy the same in this
State as in England. I know the
law is different as to the wife, and.
there are substantial reasons why'it
should be. She may always buy
necessaries on her husband's credit,

if he turn her off, without herfault, orrefse to find her i suie.
maintenance at home.",
In Varney v. Young (1839), vi
Vt. 258, the defendant lid jelhquished all claim to the services of
his minor son, and allowed him to
act for himself, and stated thatLhe
would pay none of his debts. - The
son qntered into an agreement. toserve the plaintiff as his apprentice,
under which agreement he continued to serve until he was taken
sick. The action was brought by
the plaintiff, the master, for the expenses of his sickness. It appeared
that prior to the statement made by
the father that he would not be responsible for the son's debts, the
father had requested a certain other
party to see, in the event of his
son's sickness, that he was taken
care of, and promised to pay the
expenses of his sickness, and that
"
such person had, during the son't.
illness, visited him and requested
the plaintiff to take care of hm ,
and told him that the defW t
would pay him. Justice BENNV,
in delivering the opinion of the

,'
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Court, states the law to be "well
settled, that a father is not bound
to pay for necessaries furnished to
his minor son, unless an actual
authority be proved, or the circumstances be sufficient to imply one.
There must be proof of a contract
express or implied, apriorauthority, or a subsequent recognition of
the claim." The Court held that
there was no contract express or
implied on the father's part, and
that the father having previously
notified the plaintiff that he would
not be liable, the action could not

be sustained.

In Swain v. Tyler (1853), 26 Vt.
9, the defendant had made a contract with his minor son, then nineteen years of age, whereby for a
valuable consideration he relinquished to the son all his future
earnings, and the son promised to
take care of himself and not to call
upon the defendant, his father, for
further aid. The defendant subsequently published a notice of this
agreement in a local paper, stating
that he would not be responsible
for his son's debts. The son left
his father and worked on his own
account, until overcome by sickness, when he returned, and without his father's knowledge, sent for
the plaintiff, a physician, to attend
him. The son was attended by the
plaintiff, who, having no notice or
knowledge of the agreement or of
the notice. published, charged his
bill to the defendant.
Chief
Justice R rnFr theresays: "The
father knew of the services renddrd, and made no objection, but
did not, * * assent to their
being done on his credit, either expressly orimpliedly, in fact. Under
these circumstances the only question is, whether the law implies a
promise to pay-we think it does,

on the ground, that while one's
minor children remain a part of
his family and household, and receive necessaries, with the knowledge of the father and without objection, on his part, it is the same
thing as if he received them himself, or his wife received them."
Thejud&ment of the Court below,
w ich was for the plaintiff, was
therefore affirmed.
In Virginia, the Court upholds
the rule that "A father, if of ability, is bound to maintain his infant
children, even though they may
have property of their own":
Evans v. Pearce et als. (i86o), xS
Grat. (Va.) 513, followed in Griffith
el al. v. Bird el als. (872), 22 Id.
73. In the former case the suit
was for an account against the
father's administrator, the father
being guardian defacto, havingreceived the rents and profits of the
property, and the question being
whether any allowance should be
made for his support and maintenance of such children out of the
estate. The father being able to
support his children, nothing was
allowed out of the estate therefor.
In the latter case, the father was
the guardian of his infant children,
and maintained them at his own.
expense. On his death, his creditors sought to charge his children
in the administration account, with.
the expenses of their maintenance,
but the Court held they could not
be so charged, and cited and approved of Evans v. Pearce, supra.
In Wisconsin, the father is bound.
to sifpport his minor children.
This is dearly stated by the Court
in MGoon v. Irvin (1845), 1 Pin.
(Wis.) 526, where suit was brought
to recover for the support, education and instruction of the defendant's infant children, andjudgment
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was given for the plaintiff: "By
every principle of law upon the
subject, recognized and strengthened by our statute, parents are
under legal obligation to maintain
and support their children, who are
of tender years and helpless. And
when a parent permits a stranger
to maintain, support and instruct
such children, in no way objecting
to the act, but rather assenting and
advising therein, the law will presume that he knows his obligations, accepts the services and assumes to pay." These principles,
although not expressly decided in
Carpenterv. Tatro (1874), 36 Wis.
297, aro supported thereby.
In
that case there had been a decree a
vinculo, the children remaining
with the father; subsequently the
mother married again, and one of
the children left his father's home,
through ill treatment, and resided
with his mother, whose second
husband supported it. The husband assigned his claim for its
maintenance to the wife, who
brought suit against the former
husband, the father of the child.
Her claim, however, was disallowed, upon the ground (interalia)
that it was not shown that she had
purchased the debt with her separate estate. There the Court say,
"If he was driven away by cruel
treatment, there is very high
authority for holding that the defendant was under a legal liability
to pay for his support. It is true,
there is a conflict even upon this
question, as an examination of the
authorities cited * * * shows.
But admitting the legal liability of
the defendant, and that the facts
disclosed bring the case within the

decisions which enforce the liability, still there is an insuperable
difficulty in the way of a recovery
-in the present action." The difficulty lay in the reasons above
stated.
In conclusion, it will be seenthat all the States support the oblagation as one imposed by the law
of nature, and as being a moral
obligation; but they are by no
means unanimous in holding that
such duty is also imposed upon the
father by the common law. The
weight of the authorities would,
however, seem to be in favor of
holding the duty to be one enforceable at common law as a duty cast
upon the father thereby, and thus
support and sustain the decision of
the Court in the principal case.
It is supported as a legal duty in
Alabama (supra, page3i), Connecticut (33), District of Columbia (34),
Georgia (34), Iowa (37), Kentucky
(39), Maine (4o), Maryland (41),
Massachusetts (42), Michigan (42),
Minnesota (43), Mississippi (43),
Missouri (44), North Carolina (49),
Ohio (49-5o), Tennessee (51), Texas
(51-52), Virginia (54), and Wisconsin (54-55), and it would seem.to
be the same in Arkansas (31-32).
While in California (32), and Louisiana (4o), the duty is, by the Civil
Code of each State, cast upon both
parents alike.
In Illinois (35), Indiana, independent of statute, (36), New
Hampshire (44-45), and Vermont
(52), itis considered as a were natural duty, while in New Jersey (4547), and New York (48-49), there
would seem to be a conflict of
opinion.
.NZST WATTS..
Philadelphia.

ELT v. ABSTRAcr Co.

Court of Appeals of AMaryland
JOHN W. BELT, CLERK OF THE"CIRCUIT COURT
FOR eRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
V.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY ABSTRACT
COMPANY.
Under the Maryland Code, Article X=II, Sections 1, 44; and Article
XXXVI, Section 12, it is a breach of duty on the part of the Clerk of the
Circuit Court to permit anyone to examine and make searches of the
records in his office as Clerk of the Court, except under the supervision of
himself or one .fhis deputies, upon payment of such fees as are prescribed by law.
There is no provision in the Code, sinAlar to that found in the statutes
ef the several States, giving all persons free access to the records of a

countyThe Legislature never meant to confer upon an Abstract Title Com,-

pany, chartered under the laws of that State, a privilege in that respect,
which it denied to the public.

Burton v. Tuite (1889),

29 Am

CAw LAw RGIS fR

49, distinguished-

Appeal by the defendant Clerk from a decree of the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County, sitting as a Courtof Equity,
enjoining him from interfering with employees of the Abstract Company in making extracts from the records of the
Clerk's office for that County.
Two orderly and-well-behaved employees of the Company
were s nt May i, 1890, to the Clerk's office to examine the
Public Land Records and take extracts therefrom, but were
refused unless payment should be made of fifteen cents for
every deed or conveyance searched or extracted, and of ten
cents for every one hundred words copied, being the usual
fees charged for making searches and abstracts. The Cldrk
objected that the presence of these two persons would be anobstruction to his official duties, on account of the small.
size'of the vault within which the record books were kept.
The Abstract Company had been incorporated by an-Act
of the General Assembly of Maryland, approved March 31,
x89o; wherein it was provided-
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Sac~ioN 5. And be it enacted, That said corporation may make and
may procure copies and abstracts from the public tecords of this State,
and gather information therefrom, and from other sources; relating to
conveyance of property, real and leasehold, make indexes of all deeds,
mortgages, judgihents, decrees and other records within the State of
Maryland, may make and procure and furnish plats and other matfers
relative -to property; may examine titles to property, give certificates of,
same and guarantee or insure owners and mortgagees of property, real-or
leasehold, against loss by reason of defective title, liens or other .incumbrances, and shall have the right to acquire by purchase or otherwise, and
to hold, manage and dispose of, or in any way not contrary to law deal in
any property, real, personal, or mixed, which shall be necessary to enable
the corporation to carryon its business or fulfil the powers and purpo*s
herein named.

In granting the preliminary injunction, vhich was after"

wards continued, BRoKF, A. J., said, May i9, I89O:
We were not, however, referred to any authoritative decision from the .
highest Court of this -State by which our judgment would necessarily 6e
governed; nor am I informed that such a question was ever presente
thereto. Yet the general current of precedents in othei States appear to
bear us out quite emphatically to the conclusion which we have adopted.
We derived considerable assistance and instruction from the cast of
Burton v. Tuite, reported in the January (189o) number of the Ak& nk
IAW Rn GIS'rnR, and the various decisions therein collated, and'mma e
especially frogn the case of Lum v. .cCarthy, which is referred to as
officially reported in 39 N. J. Law Rep. page 287..

C. C. Magruderand J. S. Wilson for appellant
William Stanley, C. D. Stanley and Fillmore Beall (who
kindly furnished copies of the record and opinion) for appellee.ROBiNsON, j., December i9, i89o. The appellee is anAbstract. Title Company, chartered by the Legislature -of this
State, and the question is whether its officers and employees
have the legal right themselves, to examine and make ab-.
stracts or copies of the public records in the office of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, without paying the fees which the law provides shall be paid to
the Clerk for such services?
The broad contention is, that the public records are public
property, and kept for the public benefit, and although
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their custody and safe keeping is committed by law to the
Clerk, yet eveiyone has the right*to examine them, and to
make such copies as he may see fit, free of charge
It is not pretended that this right is a common law right,and if it exists, then it must be founded upon statutory law.
What then are the provisions of the Code, upon the con.struction of which this question depends? Section r, Article XVII, provides that "Every clerk shall have the custody
of the books and papers pertaining to his office, and shall
carefully keep and preserve the same;

*

*

*

[and] he

shall give a copy of any paper or record in his office to any
person applying for the same, upon being paid the .usual fees
Then
for ianscribing such paper or record, * * *"
Section 12, Article XXXVI, prescribes the fees which shall
be-paid to the Clerk for such copies, and for making searches
-inregard to any "matter above a year's standing, if found."
ecion 44, Article XVII, further provides, as one of the
conditions of his official bond, that he shall "dulN and carefully look after, [and] preserve,

deliver up to his successor,
books,

*

*

* *

*

*

and shall

*

*

all the papers and record

in good order and repair,

*

*. "

I There is no provision in the Code, such as will be found
in
the statutes of the several States referred to at bar, "that all

persons shall have free access to the public records of a

County, and shall have the right to examine and make
copies or abstracts from the same." On the contrary, while
our Code provides that everyone shall be entitled to copies of
the records, and to the right of such information as they
may afford, yet it provides that such copies and searches shall
be made by the Clerk himself, and on the payment of such
fees as the law piescribes. And the reason of this is obvious. Upon the safe keeping and preservation of the matters of record in the Clerk's office, the most important and
valuable public and private rights depend. Here all deeds,
mortgages, decrees, judgments, and liens are recorded.
Here, too, are to be found all papers, proceedings, and
docket entries, in every suit at law and in equity. And if
everyone, whether known or unknown to the Clerk, whether
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trustworthy or untrustworthy, has the right to demand of
the Clerk that these records and papers shall be delivered to
him, and that he himself shall examine and make-abstracts
from the same, then the law affords every facility to designing and interested persons to mutilate and to impair the integrity of such records. Everyone knows that the mere
dash of the pen, the addition or alteration of a word may
change entirely the legal effect and operation of papers, matters of record; and if the appellee's contention be sound4
then the law, in requiring that the Clerk shall safely keep
and preserve such records, has imposed upofil him a duty
which it is impossible for him to perform. We have no hesitation in saying that nothing less than the plain and explicit
terms of the statute could justify a construction so fraught
with danger to the highest public interests. There is.
nothing certainly in our Code, which sustains such 'a construction. On the contrary, as we construe the several sections bearing upon the question, it would, in our opinion,
be a breach of duty on the part of the Clerk to permit anyone to examine and make searches of the records in his
office, unless it be under the supervision of himself or one of
his deputies. And such- being the case, we cannot supp.se
for a moment that the Legislature meant to confer upon the'
appellee a privilege in this respect which is denied to the
public.
The appellee is a company chartered solely for its own
private purposes, and the examination and copies of the,
records which it proposes to make, are to be used by it in
its business of guaranteeing titles to property, upon compen
sation to be paid for such service. And -though its business
may be a legitimate one, though it may be entitled, under
its charter, to copies of the public records and to the information they furnish, yet such copies and information must
be obtained through the Clerk and upon the payment of the
fees prescribed .by law. The Constitution of this State provides that the salary or compensation of the Clerks of the
Circuit Courts, "their associates and office exfienses, shall al-

ways be paid out of the fees or receipts of the offices respec-
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tive1y." And in requiring the several clerks to furnish, to
the appellee transcripts of the records, and to make an examination of the same, we cannot suppose the Legislature
meant that these services should be rendered without the
payment of such fees as the lawprescribes for such services.
We find nothing in the Code, or in the charter of the ap-

pellee to support such a construction.
And here we might rest our decision; but in the able argument at bar, it was pressed that such a construction would
be in direct conflict with the decisions of other States upon
statutes which did not differ substantially from the provisions of our Code. These decisions we have careffilly examined, and, with the exception of the one in New Jersey, they
do not seem to us to support this contention.
Now, in Burton v. Tui, decided by the Supreme Court
of Michigan, and reported in the January [189o] mmber of
the AMEICAN LAw RAG~thR, the Statute provided that the
officers having the custody of xecords should furnish proper
and reasonable fcilities for their inspection, for the purpose
having occaof making transcripts therefrons, &141ala/ersons
sion to make an examination of them for any lawful. purpose," provided, however, that such -persons should not use
pen and ink in making such transcripts or notes. And in
construing this Statute the Court held (overruling a former
,decision, Webber v. Touvnley (188o), 43 Mich. 534, delivered

by MARsrON, C. J., and concurred in by COOLIEY, CAMPBELL
and GRAvEs,JJ.) that a person engaged in the abstract title
business was a person within the meaning of the Statute, although the transcripts and examinations were made by him,
to be used in his-business for his own benefit
And so the Court decided in Hason v.
Eick st
(1887),
69 Wis. 538, under a statute of that State which provided
that the Clerk of the Circuit Court should "open to the examination of any person all books, etc., required to be so
kept in his office, and should permit any Person so examining, to take notes and cofies of suck books, recordy orpapiers."
In Lum v. McCarthy (1877), 39 N. J. Law 287, the Stat4te provided that all deeds, etc., should be recorded in books
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to be furnished by the Clerks, "to wkr/h books, every ersotr
shall have access at proper seasons, and may search the sarhe,
paying the fees allowed by law." And the Court (overruling a former decision, [FRemi'g v. Thw Clerk (1863),] xeported
in i Vroom 28o, held that an attorney had the right himself to examine the records free of charge, and that the
Clerk was not entitled to compensation, unless the exammation was made by him or his deputy. The Court make a
distinction between searches and transcrifts of record,and.
for the latter they hold the Clerk'was entitled to compensation. It is not for us to review the decision of that Court
upon .heconstruction of the statutes of that State, and it is
sufficient to say we cannot accept this case as an authority
in the construction of our Statute.
In Buck and Shencer v. Collins (1874), 51 Ga. 391, how-

ever, under a statute which provided that "all books kept
by anr public officer * * shall be subject to the ipee.
tion of all citizens," and which further provided a table-of
fees for inspection and abstracts, the Court held that a person
was not entitled to inspect and make abstracts of titles, to be
used by him in his business, for his own profit. "It was,"
say the Court, "an unnecessary flaunting of private matters
before the public gaze." And referring to the Statute which
r quired the Clerk "to keep all books, papers and dockets
belonging to his offipe, with care and security," they further
say, "he cannot do this if any person may handle or inspect
them, otherwise than under his own eye. No person has a
right to examine or inspect the records of his office, efcept
in his, the Clerk's, presence, and under his observation;"
Again, in Cormack v. Wolcott (1887), 37 Kansas -391,
where the question was whether a person in the abstract and
title business had the right to examine and make abstracts
of the public records under a Statute which provided that
"all books and papers required to be kept" by the County
officers "shall be open to the inspection and examination of
any person," the Court held that "this right of inspection
should be exercised only by persons who have an interest in
the record, or by some one for them; for the purpose of -in-
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formation, and was not intended togive a right to parties to
engage. in private speculation in connection with the information thus received."
In Brewer v. Waton (1882), 71 Ala. 299, and Bean v.
The Pqo/e (1883), 7 Colo. 200, the same construction was
given to statutes of like import.
So in all these cases, except the New Jersey case, the question as whether a person engaged in the abstract title buiness, had the right to inspect and make abstracts of titles to
be used by ltim in his own business and for his own profit,
and in regard to this question, the decisions are conflicting.
But that is not the question in this case. The appellee has
the right under its charter, to require the Clerk-to furnish to it
transcripts of title and other matters of record, and the
right to make the searches, but the contention is that the
appellee has the right through its officers and employees
themselves, to make -searches and abstracts of titles, and to
-do this, without paying the fees prescribed by lqw. There.is
nbthing in. the Code, or in the charter of the appellee, to
support this contention.
I So, whatever may be'the decisions [of the courts] of oth.r
States, it is sufficient to say, we rest our decision upon our
own construction of our Statutes, a construction which -not
only the plain terms of the Statutes, but the safety and integrity of the public records demands.
As to the answer of the appellant, it is, it seems to us,
fully responsive to every allegation in the Bill, and the exceptions thereto ought, therefore, to have been overruled,,
Order reversed, injunction dissolved,and ildmsAseL.
The decision here annotated, as
well as those mentioned in the note

to Burton v. Tuite, 29 AmUR. I4&w
RGTiRs=
49, 60, can only be
reconciled with the principle forbidding in this country a proprietary right in an office, by observing
that as in Maryland, so in some
other States, the courts are largely
moved by the possible diminution
of official fees, given in lieu of

salaries, when the statutes ae not
explicit .in giving abstracters free

access to the records. -It 'istrue
that judges express in various
rhetorical phrases, fears either for
the integrity of the public records
or the privacy of property tansfers
and encumbrances; but the language used is so extreme that the
character of the ordinary assistants
in such public offices is unduly
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praised by indirection.
At the
same time, such judicial expressions are often accompanied by
patronizing remarks upon the legitimacy of the title abstract business.
Both judges and lawyers are often
dilatory in recognizing the value of
the service to the public of those
whose abstracts must necessarily
be more convenient and condensed
than the public records.
The Maryland Judges refused to
follow the New Jersey Court of
Errors and Appeals, though without giving any reason to combat
the sound principles declared by
Chancellor RuIyox (39 N. J. Law
'239) that: "The right of the public to free access to the records, carries with it the right to search,,
wKithout charge for the privilege.
Nor can a claim on the part of the
clerk, to fees for a search not made
by himself, or his assistants, in the
records of the judgments of the
Circuit Court in his office,'bejustifled by the fact that no special provision is made for access by the
public to those i ecords. They are
no less free to the public, by reason
of the absence of a provision declaring the right. They are, in
fact, public records, and are public
property, kept in a public place, at
the public expense, for the public
benefit."
That the Maryland Court followed decisions in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia and Kansas, rather
than those in New Jersey, Michigan, Minnesota, New York and
Wisconsin, does not indicate a
freedom of opinion amid conflicting decisions, but rather an assent
to principles which cannot be of
lasting continuance: that is, to
care for official emoluments without sufficient concessions to private
enterprise; to secrecy against rival

records; to greater confidence in
the integrity of public records
when their examination is confided to the sworn officials who are
elected or appointed upon certainly
no higher moral grounds than
every abstracter must stand upon
for any success whatever; to the
propriety of continuing the former
expense and delay in obtaining information which the public officers
are bound to furnish with insufficient modern appliances; to secrecy
of property ownership against all
others than those especially inter-.
ested, excludiug those intending to
purchase before they begin negotiations; and chiefly, to a recognition of official fees as more than
compensation for official duties
rendered to individuals.
It is but fair to add that all courts.
naturally, and perhaps necessarily,
approach the determination of such
questions, by a consideration of the
statutes regulating the public offices.- Where such statutes are ofrecent date and use general language,
there is no reason why the public
nature of the records as public
notice, should be overlooked; and
in the case of statutes older than
the title abstract business, there is
equally no reason for strict construction. In either case," there is
no general question of a right to
inspect, but always the particular
expediency of duplicating land
records by private exertion. That
is, where the court desires to consider the question of interest in the
person proposing to make the abstracts, its determination should be
in the direction of the public benefit to be derived from such title abstracts. Where courts have denied
any public benefit as arising from
such business, they have, as in
Alabama, Colorado and Kansas (29

